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Abstract
The death penalty applies to two offenses under Florida law; first
degree murder’ and capital drug trafficking.2 Although Florida law also
defines sexual battery of a minor as a capital offense, the Florida Supreme
Court has ruled that the death penalty does not apply to that
offense.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The death penalty applies to two offenses under Florida law; first
degree murder' and capital drug trafficking.2 Although Florida law also
defines sexual battery of a minor as a capital offense, the Florida Su-
preme Court has ruled that the death penalty does not apply to that
offense.' Section 921.141 of the Florida Statutes governs sentencing
proceedings in first degree murder cases and Section 921.142 governs
sentencing proceedings for capital drug trafficking offenses. As of this
writing, Section 921.142 has not been used to sentence anyone to
death. Accordingly, this article will examine only first degree murder
cases and Section 921.141 sentencing proceedings.
The foregoing statute sets out a three-stage procedure for sentenc-
1. FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1) (1991).
2. FLA. STAT. § 893.135 (1991).
3. See Coler v. State, 418 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1982) (construing what is now FLA.
STAT. § 794.011(2) (1991)).
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ing in capital cases. Subsection 2 of the statute provides that, after the
defendant has been found guilty, the jury is to render a penalty verdict:
(2) ADVISORY SENTENCE BY THE JURY. - After hearing
all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory
sentence to the court, based upon the following matters:
(a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumer-
ated in subsection (5);
(b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which out-
weigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and
(c) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should be
sentenced to life imprisonment or death.4
Subsection 3 provides for the trial court to engage in its own weighing
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, notwithstanding the
jury's recommendation, and enter written findings of fact supporting
the sentencing decision.5 Nevertheless, the trial judge may not override
a life verdict unless the facts suggesting a sentence of death are "so
clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ."'6
Subsection 4 provides for automatic appellate review by the supreme
court.
7
During the period from January 1, 1990 through July 1, 1991, this
author notes the Florida Supreme Court issued a total of 82 opinions
on direct capital appeals.' In thirty-six cases, the supreme court af-
firmed the death sentences. In three, it ordered new sentencing pro-
ceedings before the trial judge. In eight, it ordered new sentencing pro-
ceedings with a new jury. In twenty, it reduced death sentences to
terms of life imprisonment. In fourteen, it ordered new trials.9 And, in
4. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (1991).
5. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1991).
6. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975). The supreme court has
followed this "Tedder doctrine" with uneven fidelity. In Cochran v. State, 547 So. 2d
928, 933 (Fla. 1989), noting that it had been inconsistent in applying Tedder over the
years, the court asserted that it would be more consistent in the future. Apparently
keeping this promise, the court reversed all but one of the override sentences to come
before it in the survey period. Thus, at least as of now, a life verdict almost guarantees
a life sentence. Hence, defects in the penalty verdict procedure will necessarily result in
defective sentencing decisions.
7. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4) (1991).
8. One case, Bryant v. State, 565 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 1990) involved the appeals of
four co-defendants. The convictions of all four were reversed.
9. Again, Bryant is counted as one case here although the court reversed the
convictions of all four appellants.
1992] 1359
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one, it ordered the defendant discharged. The author will not undertake
to discuss each of these cases at length in this article. Rather, the au-
thor will examine pertinent changes or questions created by these re-
cent decisions. This article, as shown in its table of contents, will evalu-
ate capital cases in a step-by-step approach which follows a format
beginning with the charge of a capital crime, proceeding through sen-
tencing issues, and concluding with appellate issues.
II. THE CHARGE AND DETERMINATION OF GUILT
A. The Charge
Article 1, section 15(a) of the Florida Constitution provides that
"[n]o person shall be tried for capital crime without presentment or
indictment by a grand jury."'" Although this requirement has been re-
laxed for capital sexual battery, a grand jury indictment is still a neces-
sary predicate for a prosecution for first degree murder. In the past,
Florida law has taken a dim view of attempts to open up grand jury
proceedings: grand jurors, witnesses, and prosecutors are forbidden
from discussing the proceedings; the defense has been denied access to
transcripts of grand jury proceedings; and there have been no restric-
tions on the evidence presented to the grand jury by the prosecution.
Recent decisions have called into question this traditional attitude to-
ward grand jury proceedings.
1. Presentation of Evidence
In Anderson v. State," the court ended its long-standing prohibi-
tion of judicial inquiry into evidence presented to the grand jury and
incorporated a long set of principles from other jurisdictions into Flor-
ida law. In Richard Harold Anderson's trial for first degree murder, an
important state witness, Connie Beasley, admitted that her grand jury
testimony differed from her trial testimony. Ms. Beasley testified to the
grand jury that she saw Mr. Anderson with the decedent shortly before
the murder, and that she later saw Mr. Anderson with blood on his
clothes and hands, but that she did not see the murder. At trial, she
testified that she was present when Mr. Anderson killed the decedent in
accordance with a prearranged plan. Mr. Anderson unsuccessfully
10. FLA. CONST. art. 1, sect. 15, cl. (a).
11. 574 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1991).
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moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it was based on
perjured testimony. On appeal, the supreme court upheld the trial court
ruling, concluding that the change in testimony did not "remove the
underpinnings of the indictment," and that the perjurious portion of
the grand jury testimony could not have affected the decision to in-
dict.1" Although it ultimately ruled against Mr. Anderson, the court
substantially rewrote Florida law regarding grand jury proceedings:
We agree with the authorities cited by Anderson that due process
is violated if a prosecutor permits a defendant to be tried upon an
indictment which he or she knows is based on perjured, material
testimony without informing the court, opposing counsel, and the
grand jury. This policy is predicated on the belief that deliberate
deception of the court and jury by the presentation of evidence
known by the prosecutor to be false "involve[s] a corruption of the
truth-seeking function of the trial process," United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 104, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2398, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976),
and is "incompatible with 'rudimentary demands of justice.'" Gig-
lio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153, 92 S.Ct. 763, 765, 31
L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (citation omitted). Moreover, deliberate decep-
tion is inconsistent with any principle implicit in "any concept of
ordered liberty," Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, (1959), and
with the ethical obligation of the prosecutor to respect the indepen-
dent status of the grand jury. Standards For Criminal Justice Sec-
tion 3-3.5, 3-48-3-49 (2d ed.1980); United States v. Hogan, 712
F.2d 757, 759-60 (2d Cir.1983); Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d at 108-09,
464 N.E.2d at 453, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 85 (the "cardinal purpose" of
the grand jury is to shield the defendant against prosecutorial ex-
cesses and the protection is destroyed if the prosecution may pro-
ceed upon an empty indictment).
The Florida Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be de-
prived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Art.
I, § 9, Fla. Const. The state violates that section when it requires a
person to stand trial and defend himself or herself against charges
that it knows are based upon perjured, material evidence. Govern-
mental misconduct that violates a defendant's due process rights
under the Florida constitution requires dismissal of criminal
charges. State v. Glosson, 462 So.2d 1082, 1085 (Fla. 1985)." s
Anderson is in keeping with a general trend toward opening up
12. Id. at 92.
13. Id. at 90-92.
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grand jury proceedings. A United States Supreme Court case during
the survey period addressed the constitutionality of section 905.27,
Florida Statutes, which forbids witnesses from discussing their grand
jury testimony. In Butterworth v. Smith, 4 the Court held the statute
unconstitutional insofar as it prevented a witness from discussing his
own grand jury testimony."5 The witness, a journalist, wished to write a
news story about his testimony and experiences in dealing with the
grand jury.16 The Court ruled that Florida's interest in grand jury se-
crecy, when weighed against the first amendment rights of grand jury
witnesses, diminished substantially in importance after conclusion of
the grand jury proceedings." It further noted that under present day
criminal procedure requiring the disclosure of witnesses, the interest in
grand jury secrecy is further diminished. 18
2. Access to Evidence by Defense
Anderson and Butterworth point toward further litigation of grand
jury issues. One likely area for controversy concerns access to tran-
scripts of grand jury proceedings. Section 905.27(1) of the Florida
Statutes allows for court orders for disclosure of grand jury testimony
to ascertain whether it is consistent with testimony in court, to deter-
mine whether the witness is guilty of perjury, and for the purpose of
"furthering justice."' 9 In Jent v. State,20 the supreme court affirmed
denial of the defendants' motion for access to grand jury testimony,
writing without further discussion that a "proper predicate" must be
laid to obtain access to grand jury testimony. The court has never said
what might constitute a "proper predicate." Subsequent decisions of
other courts may provide the answer.
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,2 the Court held that a defendant
charged with rape of a minor was entitled to in camera review of the
minor's welfare file notwithstanding that the file was confidential under
state law. He was entitled to this review upon his assertion that the file
14. 110 S. Ct. 1376 (1990).
15. Id. at 1379.
16. The grand jury was investigating alleged improprieties committed by the
Charlotte County State Attorney's Office and Sheriff's Department.
17. Id. at 1380-83.
18. Id. at 1382.
19. FLA. STAT. § 905.27(1) (1991).
20. 408 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1981).
21. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
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"might contain the names of favorable witnesses, as well as other, un-
specified exculpatory evidence."2 Thereafter, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held that in camera review of the records by the trial
judge was not a sufficient safeguard for the defendant's confrontation
rights, and that therefore defense counsel is entitled to see the
records.23
In Hopkinson v. Shillinger,4 the court held that Ritchie applied
to state grand jury testimony where exculpatory evidence "could have
been presented" to a post-trial grand jury investigating Hopkinson's co-
horts. On rehearing en banc, the court affirmed denial of the writ of
habeas corpus on other grounds, but let stand the panel decision on the
grand jury issue.8
In Miller v. Dugger,26 the appeals court applied Ritchie to Florida
grand jury proceedings, requiring in camera review in federal district
court.
In view of the foregoing, it seems likely that the defense will ob-
tain greater access to grand jury testimony. But what if the grand jury
testimony is not recorded? It would then be almost impossible for the
defense to make a showing of improprieties regarding grand jury pro-
ceedings or testimony. In Thompson v. State,2 7 the supreme court
showed little regard for such concerns:
Thompson made three claims regarding the grand jury proceed-
ings, two of which merit brief discussion. First, he contends that
the trial court erred by denying his pretrial request to record the
grand jury proceedings. Sections 905.17 and 905.27 of the Florida
Statutes (1987), do not establish a duty to record grand jury pro-
ceedings, nor do we find any constitutional basis to impose such a
duty in all cases. In re Report of the Grand Jury, 533 So.2d 873,
875 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); accord United States v. Head, 586 F.2d
508 (5th Cir.1978). Although recordation may be the best and
most desirable practice, e.g., State v. McArthur, 296 So.2d 97, 100
(Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 306 So.2d 123 (Fla.1974); United
States v. Head, 586 F.2d at 511, that choice generally is one for
the legislature. We agree with McArthur that the interests of jus-
22. Id.
23. Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 567 A.2d 1357 (Pa. 1989).
24. 866 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1989).
25. Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286 (10th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
26. 820 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1987). Mr. Miller and Mr. Jent were co-
defendants.
27. 565 So. 2d 1311, 1313 (Fla. 1990).
1992] 1363
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tice may require trial courts to order recordation in some instances.
McArthur, 296 So.2d at 100. However, no showing was made to
establish that Thompson had a particular need to preserve grand
jury testimony through recording. Under these circumstances, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion.
We also know of no statutory or constitutional authority to support
Thompson's second contention, that the state should be precluded
from conducting voir dire of prospective grand jurors. Implicit in
the statutory right to challenge individual prospective grand jurors,
section 905.04, Florida Statutes (1987), is the opportunity to ob-
tain information from them about their qualifications. We have
been presented with no argument to show why that should not be
done through voir dire. Certainly, Thompson has a right to fair
treatment by a lawfully composed grand jury. However, he did not
present us with the record of the voir dire, nor did he present any
evidence to show that his rights were jeopardized by the voir dire.
This claim has no merit."
It is curious for the court to uphold the refusal to record grand jury
proceedings and then complain that Mr. Thompson did not provide a
record of the voir dire of the grand jurors. Also curious is the court's
failure to mention Rule 2.070(a) of the Florida Rules of Judicial Ad-
ministration which provides for reporting of grand jury proceedings.
B. The Elements
Under section 782.04(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes, first degree
murder is the unlawful killing when "perpetrated from a premeditated
design to effect the death of the person killed or any human being" or
when "committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the
attempt to perpetrate" one of eleven listed felonies."
1. Murder Perpetrated From Premeditated Design
Although Section 782.04 refers to murder perpetrated from a pre-
meditated design, the term "premeditated design" is seldom used in the
cases, and it is not defined for the jury. Instead, the cases and jury
28. Id. at 1313.
29. FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a) (1991). The felonies are: drug trafficking; arson;
sexual battery; robbery; burglary; kidnapping; escape; aggravated child abuse; aircraft
piracy; unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; and
unlawful distribution of various drugs.
1364 [Vol. 16
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instructions generally refer to "premeditated murder." 80
2. Felony Murder
Can a defendant be guilty of felony murder if the felony occurs
after the murder? The statute provides that an unlawful killing is first
degree murder when it is committed by someone perpetrating or at-
tempting to perpetrate an enumerated felony.31 Strictly construed, this
should mean that the felony cannot occur after the murder. But the
Florida Supreme Court has not always been strict in its construction of
the statute. For instance, it has construed "in the perpetration of" as
30. The court defined "premeditated design" in McCutchen v. State, 96 So. 2d
152, 1:53 (Fla. 1957) as including an element of "deliberation" separate from
"premeditation":
A, premeditated design to effect the death of a human being is a fully
formed and conscious purpose to take human life, formed upon reflection
and deliberation, entertained in the mind before and at the time of the
homicide. The law does not prescribe the precise period of time which
must elapse between the formation of and the execution of the intent to
take human life in order to render the design a premeditated one; it may
exist only a few moments and yet be premeditated. If the design to take
human life was formed a sufficient length of time before its execution to
admit of some reflection and deliberation on the part of the party enter-
taining it, and the party at the time of the execution of the intent was fully
conscious of a settled and fixed purpose to take the life of a human being,
and of the consequence of carrying such purpose into execution, the intent
or- design would be premeditated within the meaning of the law although
the execution followed closely upon formation of the intent.
The standard jury instructions are not so complete:
"Killing with premeditation" is killing after consciously deciding to do so.
The decision must be present in the mind at the time of the killing. The
law does not fix the exact period of time that must pass between the for-
mation of the premeditated intent to kill and the killing. The period of
time must be long enough to allow reflection by the defendant. The pre-
meditated intent to kill must be formed before the killing.
The question of premeditation is a question of fact to be determined by
you from the evidence. It will be sufficient proof of premeditation if the
circumstances of the killing and the conduct of the accused convince you
beyond a reasonable doubt of the premeditation at the time of the killing.
Ifa person had a premeditated design to kill one person and in attempting
to kill that person actually kills another person, the killing is premeditated.
FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 827, 854 (1990).
The last paragraph has the following annotation: "Transferred intent; give if
applicable."
31. FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1991).
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including flight after completion of the felony.32 Recent cases reflect
the tension between the court's tendency toward loose construction and
its duty of strict construction.
In Jones v. State,3" the evidence showed that Randall Scott Jones
and another man killed a man and woman and that Mr. Jones then had
sexual union with the woman's body. He was convicted both of first
degree murder and of sexual battery, but the supreme court reversed
the sexual battery conviction because a victim of sexual battery must
be alive at the time the battery occurs and, in Jones, the victim was
dead at the time of the battery.3" Although the court did not address
the issue in the context of felony murder, it would stand to reason that,
under Jones, a defendant could not be convicted of felony murder
where the state did not prove that the decedent was alive at the time of
the felony.
But Holton v. State,3 5 decided only two weeks after Jones, sug-
gested a different result:
As his next issue, Holton claims the evidence at trial was insuffi-
cient to support a conviction for first-degree arson. He correctly
points out that an element of first-degree arson requires that the
structure be occupied by a human being. However, even though the
medical examiner testified that the victim's death occurred before
the fire was set, the jury reasonably could have inferred from all of
the evidence that Holton believed the victim was alive at the time
the fire was set.
Holton also challenges his conviction for sexual battery with great
force. This challenge is based on two grounds. The first centers on
Holton's belief that the use of the word "person" in section
794.011(3), Florida Statutes (1985), contemplates that the victim
of sexual battery must be alive. Holton argues, therefore that be-
cause the evidence could not conclusively establish the bottle was
inserted in the victim's anus before death but could only prove that
insertion occurred prior to the fire, the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction under section 794.011
Again, we are persuaded that the jury could have believed that
Holton thought the victim was alive at the time he initiated the
sexual battery. Under the facts of this case, we find there was sub-
32. Hornbeck v. State, 77 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1955).
33. 569 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1990).
34. Id. at 1237.
35. 573 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1990).
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stantial, competent evidence to support Holton's conviction for sex-
ual battery with great force. 6
The court cited no authority for the mental element it read into the
crimes of arson and sexual battery and also did not note that it had
previously held that arson and sexual battery are general intent crimes
requiring no specific intent.3"
III. DETERMINATION OF THE SENTENCE
A. The Jury Verdict Procedure
The supreme court has frequently turned down opportunities to
make the verdict more reliable by use of more accurate penalty phase
jury instructions. During the previously-mentioned survey period, the
supreme court continued to refuse to acknowledge problems with the
standard jury instruction on the "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" and "cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any
pretense of moral or legal justification" aggravating circumstances. 38
Similarly, it affirmed trial court judges' refusals to instruct on various
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.
1. The Jury as Finder of Fact
The traditional role of the jury is that of finder of fact. It would
seem that in capital cases, this would involve making factual findings
regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances. On the other
hand, the role of the capital sentencing jury has been characterized less
as a fact-finder and more as a voice of the community; it is to make "a
reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character, and
crime. '"" The characterization of the penalty verdict as "advisory"
makes the jury's role yet more ambiguous.
Section 921.141 of the Florida Statutes provides that the jury is to
determine whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist and
whether there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the
36. Id. at 290 (footnote omitted).
37. Linehan v. State, 476 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1985) (arson); Buford v. State, 492
So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1986) (sexual battery).
38. FLA. STAT. §§ 921.141(5)(h), (i) (1991).
39. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (emphasis in original).
19921 1367
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aggravating circumstances; but does not provide for special verdicts as
to the circumstances."' The statute provides that the verdict is to be
rendered by majority vote, but does not provide whether a majority is
needed to find particular aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 4'
Suppose that four jurors find the existence of only one aggravating cir-
cumstance, and four others find only the existence of a different cir-
cumstance, so that a majority of the jury rejects both circumstances.
Has there been a finding of one of the circumstances, of both, or of
neither? Neither the statute nor any decision of the Florida Supreme
Court answers these rather basic questions.
2. Jury Instructions
a. The Heinousness Circumstance
The "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" circumstance has
been the subject of controversy and criticism for years. Commentators
have written that it has not been applied consistently by the Florida
Supreme Court and that the supreme court has adopted confusing and
contradictory guidelines for its application.42 This in turn has led to
controversy regarding the standard jury instruction on the circum-
stance promulgated in 1981 and still in use during the early 1990s.
That jury instruction states without elaboration that the jury may con-
sider as an aggravating circumstance that the crime for which the de-
fendant is to be sentenced was especially wicked, evil, atrocious or
cruel.' Some historical perspective is necessary for an understanding of
40. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (1991). The court has routinely denied arguments in
favor of special verdicts on the sentencing circumstances. Jones v. State, 569 So. 2d
1234, 1238 (Fla. 1990) (citing such cases).
41. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1991).
42. See Craig Barnard, Death Penalty (1988 Survey of Florida Law), 13 NOVA
L. REV. 908 (1989); Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in
Capital Cases - The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C.L. REV. 941 (1986); and Mello,
Florida's "Heinous, Atrocious or Cruel" Aggravating Circumstance. Narrowing the
Class of Death-Eligible Cases Without Making It Smaller, 13 STETSON L.REV. 523
(1984). For an example of the confusion in the case law, compare Mills v. State, 476
So. 2d 172, 178 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986) (intent and method
employed by the wrongdoers is what needs to be examined) and Card v. State, 453 So.
2d 17 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 989 (1984) (fact that defendant enjoyed killing one
consideration in finding factor) with Pope v. State, 441 So. 2d 1073, 1078 (Fla. 1984)
(rejecting use of defendant's mental state to show heinousness).
43. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 827, 859
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the present controversy concerning this instruction.
In State v. Dixon,44 the court upheld the constitutionality of the
circumstance, writing:
The aggravating circumstance which has been most frequently at-
tacked is the provision that commission of an especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel capital felony constitutes an aggravated capital
felony. Fla.Stat. §921.141(6)(h), F.S.A. Again, we feel that the
meaning of such terms is a matter of common knowledge, so that
an ordinary man would not have to guess at what was intended. It
is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or
shockingly evil; that atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile;
and that cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with
utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others.
What is intended to be included are those capital crimes where the
actual commission of the capital felony was accompanied by such
additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital
felonies - the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessa-
rily torturous to the victim.45
The court subsequently promulgated the following standard jury in-
struction regarding the circumstance:
That the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was es-
pecially heinous, atrocious or cruel.
"Heinous" means extremely wicked or shockingly evil.
"Atrocious" means outrageously wicked and vile.
"Cruel" means designed to inflict a high degree of pain; utter indif-
ference to, or enjoyment of, the suffering of others; pitiless.46
In Proffitt v. Florida,47 the United States Supreme Court wrote
concerning the heinousness circumstance:
[The Florida Supreme Court] has recognized that while it is argua-
ble "that all killings are atrocious, . . .[s]till, we believe that the
Legislature intended something 'especially' heinous, atrocious or
(1990).
44. 283 So. 2d 1 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
45. Id. at 9. One can only speculate as to the difference between "extremely
wicked" and "outrageously wicked."
46. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 78 (1975).
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cruel when it authorized the death penalty for first degree mur-
der." Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d, at 910. As a consequence, the
court has indicated that the eighth statutory provision is directed
only at "the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily
torturous to the victim." State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d, at 9. See also
Alford v. State, 307 So.2d 433, 445 (1975); Halliwell v. State,
supra, 323 So.2d at 561. We cannot say that the provision, as so
construed, provides inadequate guidance to those charged with the
duty of recommending or imposing sentences in capital cases. See
Gregg v. Georgia, ante, 428 U.S., at 200-203:18
It is noteworthy that the part of the Dixon definition on which the Su-
preme Court focused [that the killing must be "conscienceless or piti-
less" and "unnecessarily torturous to the victim"] is not directly men-
tioned in the 1975 jury instruction.
In 1981, the Florida Supreme Court promulgated the standard in-
struction ["The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was
especially wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel"] in use through the survey
period, deleting the Dixon definitions."9
So was the state of things when the supreme court decided Pope v.
State.50 There, relying on prior decisions of the Florida Supreme Court,
the trial court applied the heinousness circumstance based on a finding
that the defendant had not shown any remorse "having elected to
steadfastly deny his guilt.""1 Holding this finding improper, the su-
preme court went on to condemn the Dixon definition of the circum-
stance as being too broad.5" The supreme court specifically disapproved
48. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255-56 (footnotes omitted). The Court mentioned
Spinkellink v. State, 313 So. 2d 666 (1975) ("career" criminal shot sleeping traveling
companion) in a footnote. It is somewhat ironic in view of subsequent decisions holding
that the heinousness circumstances does not apply when a person is killed while asleep
or unconscious. The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Spinkellink does not specify
what facts justified finding the circumstance.
49. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES (1981). The
substitution of "wicked" for "heinous" in the instruction is a mystery.
50. 441 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 1984).
51. Id. at 1077.
52. Id. In a previous case, Vaught v. State, 410 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1982), the court
had disapproved of the Dixon definition as too narrow, writing:
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding that the killing was
especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. He argues that since the shooting
was spontaneous and caused nearly instanttaneous death, it cannot come
within the meaning of this aggravating circumstance, which, under the in-
terpretations given by this Court, focuses on the infliction of physical pain
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of the "conscienceless or pitiless" phrase on the ground that it improp-
erly focused on the "mindset of the murderer," thus leading to im-
proper application of the circumstance.53 On the same ground it disap-
proved of the "utter indifference to, or enjoyment of, the suffering of
others. . ., "the pitiless" portion of the definition of "cruel" in the
1975 instruction. It approved of use of the 1981 instruction, adding:
"No further definitions of the terms are offered, nor is the defendant's
mindset ever at issue." '54 Thus, the court eliminated the construction
that had made the circumstance constitutional under Proffitt. The Pope
instruction gives the jury no suggestion of the constitutional limitations
on the circumstance. The jury is free to apply the circumstance to any
homicide, for reasonable jurors could conclude that any murder is espe-
cially wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel.
At this point, the Oklahoma death sentence of William Cartwright
enters the story. 5 In sentencing Mr. Cartwright, an Oklahoma jury
employed that state's "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravat-
ing circumstance.56 The court's instructions to the jury defined the cir-
cumstance in terms taken directly from Dixon.57 Cartwright's death
sentence ultimately came before the United States Supreme Court,
which unanimously held that the Oklahoma circumstance was uncon-
or mental anguish. State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d I (Fla.1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 943, 94 S.Ct. 1950, 40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974); White v. State, 403
So.2d 331 (Fla.1981). In response the state correctly points out that the
factor heinous, atrocious, or cruel has also been approved based on the fact
that a killing was inflicted in a "cold and calculating" or "execution-style"
fashion. See, e.g., Magill v. State, 386 So.2d 1188 (Fla.1980), cert. de-
nied, 450 U.S. 927, 101 S.Ct. 1384, 67 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981); Alvord v.
State, 322 So.2d 533 (Fla.1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923, 96 S.Ct.
3234, 49 L.Ed.2d 1226 (1976); Sullivan v. State, 303 So.2d 632
(Fla.1974), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 3226, 49 L.Ed.2d 1220
(1976).
id. at 151.
53. Pope, 441 So. 2d at 1077.
54. Id. at 1078.
55. See Cartwright v. State, 695 P.2d 548 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985).
56. Id.
57. Id. On habeas review of the death sentence, the Tenth Circuit wrote: "The
jury at Cartwright's trial had been instructed that the term 'heinous' means extremely
wicked or shockingly evil; 'atrocious' means outrageously wicked and vile; 'cruel' means
pitiless, or designed to inflict a high degree of pain, utter indifference to, or enjoyment
of, the sufferings of others." Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1488 (10th Cir.
1987) (en banc). The federal appeals court traced the history of the circumstance and
showed that Oklahoma's definition derived from Dixon. Id. at 1487.
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stitutionally vague because it gave the jury no guidance as to its appli-
cation. 8 In reaching this result, the Court relied on its decision in God-
frey v. Georgia,59 which found unconstitutional a Georgia death
sentence based on a jury finding that the murder "was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity
of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim." The Maynard Court
wrote:
[T]he language of the Oklahoma aggravating circumstance at issue
- "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" - gave no more guid-
ance than the "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman"
language that the jury returned in its verdict in Godfrey. The
State's contention that the addition of the word "especially" some-
how guides the jury's discretion, even if the term "heinous" does
not, is untenable. To say that something is "especially heinous"
merely suggests that the individual jurors should determine that
the murder is more than just "heinous," whatever that means, and
an ordinary person could honestly believe that every unjustified, in-
tentional taking of human life is "especially heinous." Godfrey,
supra, at 428-429, 100 S.Ct. at 1764-1765. Likewise, in Godfrey
the addition of "outrageously or wantonly" to the term "vile" did
not limit the overbreadth of the aggravating factor. 60
58. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
59. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
60. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363-64. The premise underlying Maynard is that the
Eighth Amendment requires greater definiteness in the definition of aggravating cir-
cumstances than the Due Process Clause requires of criminal statutes:
The difficulty with the State's argument is that it presents a Due Process
Clause approach to vagueness and fails to recognize the rationale of our
cases construing and applying the Eighth Amendment. Objections to
vagueness under the Due Process Clause rest on the lack of notice, and
hence may be overcome in any specific case where reasonable persons
would know that their conduct is at risk. Vagueness challenges to statutes
not threatening First Amendment interests are examined in light of the
facts of the case at hand; the statute is judged on an as-applied basis.
United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92-23, 96 S.Ct. 316, 46 L.Ed.2d 228
(1975); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42
L.Ed.2d 706 (1975); Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 91 S.Ct.
1563, 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971) (per curiam); United States v. National
Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 36, 83 S.Ct. 594, 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963).
Claims of vagueness directed at aggravating circumstances defined in capi-
tal punishment statutes are analyzed under the Eighth Amendment and
characteristically assert that the challenged provision fails adequately to
inform juries what they must find to impose the death penalty and as a
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The Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to declare the
Pope instruction unconstitutional. In Smalley v. State,6 1 the court
wrote:
His first claim involves the aggravating circumstance that the kill-
ing was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. His argument is
predicated on the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100
L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). In that case, the Court relied upon its early
[sic] decision in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759,
64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), to hold that Oklahoma's aggravating fac-
tor of "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" was unconstitution-
ally vague. Smalley argues that because Florida uses the same
words (section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1987)), Florida's
aggravating factor also is unconstitutionally vague under the eighth
amendment.
Initially, we note that Smalley did not object to the standard jury
instruction given on this subject which explained that in order for
this circumstance to be applicable, it was necessary for the crime to
have been especially wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel. Therefore, to
the extent that Smalley now complains of the jury instruction, the
point has been waived. Sullivan v. State, 303 So.2d 632 (Fla.
1974), cert. denied, 428 U.S.911, 96 S.Ct. 3226, 49 L.Ed.2d 1220
(1976). However, Smalley's claim has broader implications because
he contends that the aggravating circumstance of heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel is unconstitutionally vague under the eighth and
fourteenth amendments. In order to set the issue at rest, we will
discuss the merits of Smalley's argument.
It is true that both the Florida and Oklahoma capital sentencing
laws use the phrase "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." How-
ever, there are substantial differences between Florida's capital
sentencing scheme and Oklahoma's. In Oklahoma the jury is the
sentencer, while in Florida the jury gives an advisory opinion to the
trial judge, who then passes sentence. The trial judge must make
findings that support the determination of all aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances. Thus, it is possible to discern upon what
facts the sentencer relied in deciding that a certain killing was hei-
nous, atrocious, or cruel.
result leaves them and appellate courts with the kind of open-ended discre-
tion which was held invalid in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct.
2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972).
Maynard, 486 U.S. at 361-62.
61. 546 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1989).
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This Court has narrowly construed the phrase "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" so that it has a more precise meaning than the
same phrase has in Oklahoma. In State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9
(Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943, 94 S.Ct. 1950, 40 L.Ed.2d
295 (1974), we said:
It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely
wicked or shockingly evil; that atrocious means outra-
geously wicked and vile; and, that cruel means designed
to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference
to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others. What
is intended to be included are those capital crimes
where the actual commission of the capital felony was
accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime
apart from the norm of capital felonies - the con-
scienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily tor-
turous to the victim.
It was because of this narrowing construction that the Supreme
Court of the United States upheld the aggravating circumstance of
heinous, atrocious, or cruel against a specific eighth amendment
vagueness challenge in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct.
2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976). Indeed, this Court has continued to
limit the finding of heinous, atrocious, or cruel to those conscience-
less or pitiless crimes which are unnecessarily torturous to the vic-
tim. E.g., Garron v. State, 528 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1988); Jackson v.
State, 502 So.2d 409 (Fla. 1986), cert denied, 482 U.S. 920, 107
S.Ct. 3198, 96 L.Ed.2d 686 (1987); Jackson v. State, 498 So.2d
906 (Fla. 1986); Teffeteller v. State, 439 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1074, 104 S.Ct. 1430, 79 L.Ed.2d 754
(1984). That Proffitt continues to be good law today is evident
from Maynard v. Cartwright, wherein the majority distinguished-
Florida's sentencing scheme from those of Georgia and Oklahoma.
See Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S.Ct. at 1859.62
Thus, the supreme court avoided the jury instruction issue on the
ground of procedural default, but went on to assert that the circum-
stance was constitutional as construed in Dixon.6" The supreme court
62. Id. at 722.
63. Close below the surface in Smalley is the notion that accurate penalty phase
jury instructions are not necessary because the trial judge will apply the "correct" con-
struction of the circumstance. This idea is contrary to the many cases in which the
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apparently forgot that in Pope it had read Dixon out of the statute and
jury instructions. Since Smalley did not purport to deal with the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of the jury instruction, it would have
seemed that another case would have to deal with that issue.
But thereafter, the supreme court acted as though Smalley had
disposed of the issue. In Brown v. State,64 the supreme court rejected
an argument that the jury instruction on the premeditation aggravating
circumstance was unconstitutionally vague under Maynard and wrote:
In Maynard the Court held the Oklahoma instruction on heinous,
atrocious, and cruel unconstitutionally vague because it did not ad-
equately define that aggravating factor for the sentencer (in
Oklahoma, the jury). We have previously found Maynard inappo-
site to Florida's death penalty sentencing regarding this state's hei-
nous, atrocious, and cruel aggravating factor. Smalley v. State,
546 So.2d 720 (Fla.1989). We find Brown's attempt to transfer
Maynard to this state and to a different aggravating factor mis-
placed. See Jones v. Dugger, 533 So.2d 290 (Fla.1988); Daugherty
v. State, 533 So.2d 287 (Fla.1988). We therefore find no error re-
garding the penalty instructions.65
Similar findings resulted in Roberts v. State66 and Occhicone v.
State.67 In the meantime, the court "approve[d] for publication" the
following jury instruction resurrecting the Dixon definition condemned
in Pope:
The aggravating circumstances that you may consider are limited
to any of the following that are established by the evidence:
court has reversed for resentencing where the trial court committed error in instructing
the penalty jury. It is also contrary to Cochran v. State, 547 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1989)
and other cases emphasizing the importance of the penalty verdict. Most curious of all,
is how Smalley interplays with the presumption (espoused in Gilliam v. State, 582 So.
2d 610 (Fla. 1991)) that the judge is presumed to follow the jury instructions. If the
judge follows the jury instructions, and the jury instructions are unconstitutional, how
can there be a presumption of correctness regarding the trial court's findings in the
sentencing order?
64. 565 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1990).
65. Id. at 308. Jones and Daugherty involved collateral attacks on death
sentences. In both cases, the court held without analysis that Maynard did not apply
where the trial court did not find the heinousness circumstance.
66. 568 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 1990).
67. 570 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1990).
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8.The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was espe-
cially heinous, atrocious or cruel. "Heinous" means extremely
wicked or shockingly evil. "Atrocious" means outrageously wicked
and vile. "Cruel" means designed to inflict a high degree of pain
with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of
others. The kind of crime intended to be included as heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel is one accompanied by additional acts that show that
the crime was conscienceless or pitiless and was unnecessarily tor-
turous to the victim.68
In originally submitting the instruction,69 the chairman of the jury in-
struction committee wrote that the committee decided that additional
language, based on Dixon, improved the instruction enough to address
any problems posed by Maynard v. Cartwright.
The supreme court made no mention of Pope, Vaught, or the
Smalley line of cases. One can only wonder why it is necessary to
amend the jury instructions if, as the supreme court has asserted, May-
nard does not apply to Florida.
It is questionable whether the new instruction satisfies the require-
ments of Maynard. The new instruction's definitions of "heinous,"
"atrocious," and "cruel" are virtually identical to the definitions used
at Mr. Maynard's Oklahoma trial, and are exactly identical to defini-
tions declared unconstitutional in Shell v. Mississippi."' Although the
final sentence includes the terms "conscienceless or pitiless" and "un-
necessarily torturous" approved in Proffitt, the instruction does not in-
form the jury that the circumstance applies only to the conscienceless
or pitiless crime that is unnecessarily torturous. Further, Proffitt itself
is suspect on this point because it did not use Maynard's Eighth
Amendment analysis in ruling on the constitutionality of Section
921.141 of the Florida Statutes. The Court wrote in Proffitt that the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances
require no more line drawing than is commonly required of a
68. Standard Jury Instructions, 579 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1990).
69. After the court initially approved the instruction, the Florida Public Defend-
ers' Association and the Volunteer Lawyers Resource Center sought reconsideration.
The court then remanded the matter to the jury instruction committee for further con-
sideration, and the committee proposed a different instruction, incorporating language
from Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1990). The supreme court rejected the
Porter instruction, and denied rehearing, thus approving again the Dixon instruction
and the original committee note.
70. 111 S. Ct. 313 (1990).
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factfinder in a lawsuit. For example, juries have traditionally evalu-
ated the validity of defenses such as insanity or reduced capacity,
both of which involve the same considerations as some of the
above-mentioned mitigating circumstances. While the various fac-
tors to be considered by the sentencing authorities do not have nu-
rnerical weights assigned to them, the requirements of Furman are
satisfied when the sentencing authority's discretion is guided and
channeled by requiring examination of specific factors that argue
in favor of or against imposition of the death penalty, thus elimi-
nating total arbitrariness and capriciousness in its imposition. 71
Proffitt held only that the conscienceless/pitiless construction saved the
circumstance from attack as being facially constitutional, but did not
decide whether it defined the circumstance adequately for lay jurors.
Finally, the new instruction does not inform the jury of various other
restrictions on application of the circumstance, such as that acts per-
formed on the dead body cannot be considered in determining the cir-
cumstance,"7 that lack of remorse cannot be considered, 7 and that
there must be a showing of torturous intent. 4
b. Other Aggravating Circumstances
In Brown and other cases discussed above, the court has flatly re-
fused to apply the principles of Maynard to the premeditation aggra-
vating circumstance. 75 Now the jury instruction on this circumstance
merely tracks the language of the statute,7" so it is likely to violate
Maynard if the statutory language is unconstitutionally vague under
the eighth amendment. In Rogers v. State,8 the supreme court as
71. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 257-58.
72. See Jones v. State, 569 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1990).
73. Id. at 1240.
74. An on-again, off-again requirement.
75. "The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated,
and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification." FLA.
STAT. § 921.141(5)(i) (1991).
76. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 827, 859 (as
amended through March 30, 1989).
77. The Florida Supreme Court has never adopted a precise and authoritative
construction of this circumstance. For a detailed discussion of the circumstance, see
Jonathan Kennedy, Florida's "Cold, Calculated and Premeditated" Aggravating Cir-
cumstance in Death Penalty Cases, 17 STET. L. REV. 47, 96-97 (1987) and Craig Bar-
nard, Death Penalty (1988 Survey of Florida Law), 13 NOVA L. REV. 907 (1989). As
discussed in this article, the court produced considerable confusion in trying to define
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much as acknowledged that the circumstance was on its face suscepti-
ble to misapplication, receded from prior applications, and wrote that it
was to apply only where there was "heightened" premeditation.7 9 Nev-
ertheless, the court has not promulgated any jury instruction narrowing
the circumstance as required by Rogers, and seems to consider the pre-
sent instruction acceptable. Similarly, although the court has adopted
narrowing constructions as to almost all of the other aggravating cir-
cumstances, the standard jury instructions merely track the statute and
give no hint of these limiting constructions. The failure of the standard
instructions to define the circumstances would seem to make them un-
constitutional under Maynard.
c. Mitigation
As originally promulgated, Section 921.141 of the Florida Statutes
contained a list of eight mitigating circumstances.8 0 During the first
few years of the statute's operation, it was thought that the jury and
judge could consider only the listed circumstances in reaching their
sentencing decisions. 1 But, subsequent decisions by the United States
Supreme Court have made clear that such a limitation on mitigation
violates the Eighth Amendment.82 Accordingly, the Florida Supreme
and apply the circumstance during the survey period.
78. 511 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020 (1988).
79. As discussed in this article, Rogers purported to define only the "calculated"
element of the circumstance. In Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1063-1064 (Fla.
1990), the court indicated that the Constitution required the narrowing construction
given in Rogers.
80. FLA. STAT. § 921,141 (1991). Over the years, the list has been shortened and
otherwise modified in ways that narrow the application of the circumstances. One cir-
cumstance ("The capital felony was committed under circumstances which the defend-
ant believed to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.") has been
eliminated. The duress circumstance ("The defendant acted under duress or under the
domination of another person.") has been narrowed by requiring that the duress be
"extreme" or the domination "substantial." The impairment circumstance ("At the
time of the capital felony the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a
result of mental disease or intoxication.") now requires that the defendant's capacity be
"substantially" impaired, although it no longer requires that the impairment be caused
by mental disease or intoxication. On the other hand, the youth circumstance has been
changed so that the "age" (rather than the "youth") of the defendant may be consid-
ered in mitigation.
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Court has promulgated a "catchall" jury instruction to allow considera-
tion of so-called nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. 8 But, although
it has gone so far as to formally recognize "categories" of nonstatutory
circumstances in Campbell v. State,' and to recognize various nonstat-
utory circumstances as "particularly compelling" in Songer v. State,85
the court has refused without discussion to allow penalty phase instruc-
tions bearing directly on different nonstatutory circumstances.
In Jackson v. State,8" the court gave short shrift to an argument
that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury according to a
written list of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances prepared by the
defense: "We find these contentions without merit. Florida's standard
jury instruction complies with the constitutional principles set forth in
Lockett v. Ohio."87
During the survey period, the court continued to disfavor jury in-
structions on nonstatutory circumstances. In Randolph v. State,88 the
court listed as "meritless and warranting no discussion" argument that
"the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury separately on spe-
cific nonstatutory circumstances. "89
In Stewart v. State,90 a state witness testified that the defendant
was "'drunk most of the time" in the period after the shooting, and one
Dr. Merin, a psychologist, testified that the defendant was (in the
court's phrase) "impaired but not substantially so" at the time of the
offense.91 The defense sought a jury instruction on the "substantially
impaired" statutory mitigating circumstance,92 and, alternatively, an
instruction on the same circumstance without the adverb "substan-
tially." The trial court denied both requests. 9 Without comment or
elaboration, the supreme court wrote that the trial court "properly re-
83. "Any other aspect of the defendant's character or record, and any other cir-
cumstance of the offense," FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL
CASES 827, 860 (as amended through March 30, 1989).
84. 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990).
85. 544 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1989).
86. 530 So. 2d 269, 273 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 882 (1989).
87. Id. at 273 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)).
88, 562 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1990).
89, Id. at 339.
90. 558 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1990).
91. Id. at 420.
92. "The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired." FLA.
STAT. § 921.141(6)(f) (1991).
93. Stewart, 558 So. 2d at 420.
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fused" to give the instruction without the adverb, but then held that
the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the "substantiNlly
impaired" circumstance:
The trial court determined that the instruction on impaired capac-
ity was inappropriate on the basis of Dr. Merin's additional testi-
mony that he believed that Stewart was impaired but not substan-
tially so. The qualified nature of Dr. Merin's testimony does not
furnish a basis for denying the requested instruction. As noted
above, an instruction is required on all mitigating circumstances
"for which evidence has been presented" and a request is made.
Once a reasonable quantum of evidence is presented showing im-
paired capacity, it is for the jury to decide whether it shows "sub-
stantial" impairment. (No instruction required upon bare presenta-
tion of controverted evidence of alcohol and marijuana
consumption, without more). To allow an expert to decide what
constitutes "substantial" is to invade the province of the jury. Nor
may a trial judge inject into the jury's deliberations his views rela-
tive to the degree of impairment by wrongfully denying a requested
instruction.
The Legislature intended that the trial judge determine the sen-
tence with advice and guidance provided by a jury, the one institu-
tion in the system of Anglo-American jurisprudence most honored
for fair determinations of questions decided by balancing opposing
factors. If the advisory function were to be limited initially because
the jury could only consider those mitigating and aggravating cir-
cumstances which the trial judge decided to be appropriate in a
particular case, the statutory scheme would be distorted. The jury's
advice would be pre-conditioned by the judge's view of what they
were allowed to know.
We are unable to say beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure to
give the requested instruction had no effect on this jury's recom-
mended sentence. This error mandates a new sentencing
proceeding. 94
Thus, the supreme court upheld the refusal to instruct on a nonstatu-
tory circumstance95 directly supported by the evidence and reversed the
94. Id. at 420-21.
95. There can be little doubt that less than substantial impairment is a mitigat-
ing circumstance. Cf. Perry v. State, 522 So. 2d 817, 821 (Fla. 1988) (jury could prop-
erly consider "psychological stress" as nonstatutory mitigation) and Cheshire v. State,
568 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1990) (error for judge to limit consideration of mental distur-
bance to "extreme" mental disturbance - Florida's capital sentencing statute does in
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refusal to instruct on a statutory circumstance directly contradicted by
the evidence.
Another paradox arises from Nixon v. State,"' and Jones v.
State.9" After Joe Elton Nixon was convicted of first degree murder,
kidnapping, robbery, and arson, the trial court at the penalty phase
refused to give a defense requested jury instruction on the maximum
penalties for the noncapital offenses of which he was convicted [defense
counsel wished to argue that the jury could consider in mitigation the
possibility that Mr. Nixon would receive long consecutive sentences for
those offenses and would therefore never be released from prison].
The supreme court approved of the trial court's ruling on two grounds:
first, that Rule 3.390(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, forbids
jury instructions on the penalties for noncapital offenses; and second,
that "[t]he fact that Nixon was convicted of three other offenses each
of which carried lengthy maximum penalties is irrelevant to his charac-
ter, prior record, or the circumstances of the crime." 9 The court went
on to note that, in any event, the proposed instruction did not state that
the noncapital sentences could be considered as mitigation, that counsel
did argue them as mitigation, and that the jury was instructed that the
factors which it could consider in mitigation were unlimited. 100
Nixon seems irreconcilably contrary to Jones, which had been de-
cided less than three months earlier. In Jones, the court held that the
trial court had erred by not letting defense counsel argue that the jury
could consider in mitigation that the defendant could receive consecu-
tive sentences for the two murders of which he was convicted:
fact require that emotional disturbance be "extreme," however, it clearly would be
unconstitutional for the state to restrict the trial court's consideration solely to "ex-
treme" emotional disturbances. Under the case law, any emotional disturbance relevant
to the crime must be considered and weighed by the sentencer).
96. 572 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1990).
97. 569 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1990).
98. Nixon, 572 So. 2d at 1344-45.
99. Id. at 1345.
100. Id. To the extent that Nixon stands for the principle that argument of coun-
sel is a substitute for jury instructions, it is contrary to, e.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436
U.S. 478, 488-89 (1978) (failure to instruct on presumption of innocence - arguments
of counsel cannot substitute for instructions by the court) and Mellins v. State, 395 So.
2d 1207, 1209 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (argument of counsel no substitute for
complete jury instructions - it is not a sufficient refutation of appellant's argument to
suggest that her counsel's summation sufficiently apprised the jury of the effect of in-
toxication on the scienter required to support the charge to relieve the Court of its duty
to give an appropriate instruction).
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The standard for admitting evidence of mitigation was announced
in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, (1978). The sentencer may not
be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor, "any aspect
of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances
of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death." Id. at 604. Indeed, the Court has recognized that
the state may not narrow a sentencer's discretion to consider rele-
vant evidence "that might cause it to decline to impose the death
sentence." McClesky v. Kemp, 482 U.S. 279, 304, (1987) (empha-
sis in original; footnote omitted). Counsel was entitled to argue to
the jury that Jones may be removed from society for at least fifty
years should he receive life sentences on each of the two murders.
The potential sentence is a relevant consideration of "the circum-
stances of the offense" which the jury may not be prevented from
considering."'
In Randolph, Stewart, and Nixon, the supreme court refused to
authorize various jury instructions regarding specific nonstatutory miti-
gating circumstances. The supreme court has not offered any detailed
explanation for this refusal, and it is difficult to reconcile it with the
announcement in Campbell that "categories" of nonstatutory circum-
stances are to be treated like the statutory circumstances, and with the
general trend toward greater reliance on the jury's penalty verdict. 102
How, one wonders, can the penalty verdict be reliable where the jury
does not receive instructions on the rather elaborate body of law gov-
erning the consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances?
The court's response would seem to be that the "catchall" instruc-
tion sufficiently directs the jury's attention to the nonstatutory evidence
and gives the jury sufficient guidance in evaluating them. Blystone v.
Pennsylvania,10 3 lends support for such a position. Scott Wayne Blys-
tone was convicted of first degree murder, robbery, conspiracy to com-
mit homicide, and conspiracy to commit robbery. The evidence showed
that he and others picked up a hitchhiker, and took him to a field
where Mr. Blystone robbed and killed him.'04 The defense presented no
101. Jones, 569 So. 2d at 1239-40. In Cooper v. State, 581 So. 2d 49, 52 (1991)
(Barkett, J., concurring), Justice Barkett pointed out that evidence that the defendant
would not be released from prison even after service of the mandatory minimum
twenty-five years supported the mitigating circumstance that the defendant did not "in
the future pose a danger to the community if he were not executed."
102. See Campbell, 571 So. 2d at 415.
103. 110 S. Ct. 1078 (1990).
104. Id. at 1080.
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mitigating evidence at sentencing. After affirmance of his conviction
and resulting death sentence on appeal, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari "to decide whether the mandatory aspect of
the Pennsylvania death penalty statute renders the penalty imposed
upon petitioner unconstitutional because it improperly limited the dis-
cretion of the jury in deciding the appropriate penalty for his crime."' 10 5
Mr. Blystone's principle argument attacked as unconstitutional the pro-
vision of the statute requiring imposition of the death sentence where
the jury found at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating
circumstances. 10 6 A subsidiary argument was that jury instructions
pursuant. to 42 Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes section 9711(e)
[which contains a list of mitigating circumstances similar to the list in
section 921.141(6) of the Florida Statutes] were unconstitutional.107
The Court wrote regarding this subsidiary argument:
Next, petitioner maintains that the mandatory aspect of his sen-
tencing instructions foreclosed the jury's consideration of certain
mitigating circumstances. The trial judge gave the jury examples of
mitigating circumstances that it was entitled to consider, essen-
tially the list of factors contained in § 9711 (e). Among these, the
judge stated that the jury was allowed to consider whether peti-
tioner was affected by an "extreme" mental or emotional distur-
bance, whether petitioner was "substantially" impaired from ap-
preciating his conduct, or whether petitioner acted under
"extreme" duress. This claim bears scant relation to the mandatory
aspect of Pennsylvania's statute, but in any event we reject it. The
judge at petitioner's trial made clear to the jury that these were
merely items they could consider, and that it was also entitled to
consider "any other mitigating matter concerning the character or
record of the defendant, or the circumstances of his offense." App.
12-13. This instruction fully complied with the requirements of
Lockett and Penry.
Three Terms ago, in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, we sum-
105. Id. at 1081. The Pennsylvania statute is generally similar to the Florida
Statute in that it contains lists of aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be con-
sidered at sentencing. It differs in that it leaves the sentencing decision with the jury,
and mandates that the jury sentence the defendant to death "if the jury unanimously
finds at least one aggravating circumstance . . . and no mitigating circumstance or if
the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any
mitigating circumstances." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (1990).
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marized the teachings of the Court's death penalty jurisprudence:
In sum, our decisions since Furman have identified a
constitutionally permissible range of discretion in im-
posing the death penalty. First, there is a required
threshold below which the death penalty cannot be im-
posed. In this context, the State must establish rational
criteria that narrow the decisionmaker's judgment as to
whether the circumstances of a particular defendant's
case meet the threshold. Moreover, a societal consensus
that the death penalty is disproportionate to a particular
offense prevents a State from imposing the death pen-
alty for that offense. Second, States cannot limit the
sentencer's consideration of any relevant circumstance
that could cause it to decline to impose the penalty. In
this respect, the State cannot channel the sentencer's
discretion, but must allow it to consider any relevant in-
formation offered by the defendant.
We think petitioner's sentence under the Pennsylvania statute satis-
fied these requirements. The fact that other States have enacted
different forms of death penalty statutes which also satisfy consti-
tutional requirements casts no doubt on Pennsylvania's choice.
Within the constitutional limits defined by our cases, the States
enjoy their traditional latitude to prescribe the method by which
those who commit murder shall be punished. 08
Blystone does not address the question of whether the trial court
must instruct on specific recognized nonstatutory circumstances. 10 9
Thus it does not resolve the following questions arising from Stewart:110
If the "catchall" instruction acts as a panacea by permitting considera-
tion of all mitigation why was a new sentencing hearing required in
Stewart and the cases cited in it? Could the jury not have used the
"catchall" instruction as license to consider Dr. Merin's testimony?
Why have jury instructions on the statutory circumstances at all, yet
not have them on the Campbell categories? The Florida Supreme
108. Id.
109. Curiously, neither the majority nor the dissent considered Mr. Blystone's
specific argument, which was that the jurors could reasonably have concluded that they
were forbidden from considering duress or disturbance that was not extreme or impair-
ment that was not substantial.
110. 558 So. 2d at 416.
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Court has yet to address these questions.
B. Reliance on the Penalty Verdict
Florida's capital sentencing statute provides for an "advisory" pen-
alty verdict rendered by the jury, but places on the trial court judge the
responsibility for imposition of sentence."' But a jury verdict for life
imprisonment is not merely "advisory." It has a powerful presumption
of correctness and is to be overridden by the trial court only where
"virtually no reasonable person" could agree with it.1 2 The override
procedure and the Tedder doctrine have been criticized both in and out
of the court. Justice Shaw has written at some length in favor of aboli-
tion of the Tedder doctrine." 3 Other commentators have suggested
that the override procedure itself cannot be administered consist-
ently."' Both Justice Shaw and these commentators agree that the
court has not been consistent in its application of Tedder.
Over the years, a recurring problem in the application of Tedder
has arisen when the sentencing judge has had information typically
from a pre-sentence investigation report" 5 unavailable to the jury. In
111. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2), (3) (1991).
112. Tedder, 322 So. 2d at 910. As noted in a previous section of this article, the
supreme court de-emphasized the importance of the jury's role in Smalley, indicating
that, since the judge knows the law and will therefore apply it accurately, it is not
necessary that the jury be accurately instructed on the law.
113. Grossman v. State, 525 So.2d 833, 846-51 (Fla. 1986) (Shaw, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989).
114. Skene, Review of Capital Cases: Does The Florida Supreme Court Know
What It's Doing?, 15 STET. L. REV. 263, 298-306 (1986). Mr. Skene writes that "it is
hypocritical to deem a jury 'unreasonable' in discounting its sentence recommendation
while upholding a verdict of guilt 'to the exclusion of and beyond every reasonable
doubt.'" Id. at 305. See also Mello and Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida's Practice
of Imposing Death Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 31 (1985).
115. The use of pre-sentence investigation reports (generally referred to as PSI's)
promises to be the source of litigation in years to come. Prepared by probation officers,
these reports typically contain specific sections for "Victim Impact Statements" and for
personal remarks and recommendations by police officers and prosecutors. Also, their
preparation typically involves interviews with defendants without notice to, or the pres-
ence of, counsel. Thus the preparation of such reports often involves substantial viola-
tions of the principles set out in cases such as Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)
(victim impact statement), Jackson v. Dugger, 547 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1989) (effect of
killing on law enforcement officers), and Powell v. Texas, 109 S. Ct. 3146 (1989)
(statement of defendant to state psychiatrist for use at sentencing). See Mills v. Dug-
get, 574 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1990) (declining to address issue on ground of procedural
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Cochran v. State,"" the court directly confronted this problem. Guy
Cochran was convicted of first degree murder in the death of Carol
Harris. The penalty phase of the jury proceeding occurred immediately
after the guilt phase and resulted in a life verdict.1 17 Prior to sentencing
by the judge in that case, Mr. Cochran was tried and convicted of an-
other first degree murder. Using, as an aggravating circumstance, this
subsequent capital conviction of which the Harris jury was unaware, 18
the trial court overrode the life verdict and imposed a death sen-
tence. 1 9 In reducing the sentence to one of life imprisonment, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court wrote that the existence of the additional aggravat-
ing circumstance did not make the jury's life verdict so unreasonable as
to justify the override. The court recognized that in the past it had
upheld override sentences in such circumstances, but wrote that the life
verdict retains its strong presumption of correctness even when based
on less information than is available to the judge. After examining the
mitigating evidence presented by the defense, the court concluded that
the evidence was sufficient to support a life sentence. 120 In response to a
vigorous dissent by Justice Ehrlich, joined by Justices Shaw and
Grimes,' 2 ' and belatedly, to Justice Shaw's concurring opinion in
Grossman v. State,'22 the Cochran majority acknowledged that the su-
preme court had not consistently applied Tedder in the past:
Finally, we agree with the dissent that "legal precedent consists
more in what courts do than in what they say." However, 'in ex-
pounding upon this point to prove that Tedder has not been applied.
with the force suggested by its language, the dissent draws entirely
from cases occurring in 1984 or earlier. This is not indicative of
what the present court does, as Justice Shaw noted in his special
concurrence to Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833, 851 (Fla. 1988)
(Shaw, J., specially concurring):
During 1984-85, we affirmed on direct appeal trial
judge overrides in eleven of fifteen cases, seventy-three
percent. By contrast, during 1986 and 1987, we have
default).
116. 547 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1989).
117. Id. at 929.
118. A prior conviction of a capital offense is a statutory aggravating circum-
stance. FLA. STAT. § 941.141(5)(b) (1991).
119. Cochran, 547 So. 2d at 929.
120. Id. at 932.
121. Id. at 933.
122. 525 So. 2d 833, 846-51 (Fla. 1986) (Shaw, J., concurring).
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affirmed overrides in only two of eleven cases, less than
twenty percent. This current reversal rate of over eighty
percent is a strong indicator to judges that they should
place less reliance on their independent weighing of ag-
gravation and mitigation ...
Clearly, since 1985 the Court has determined that Tedder means
precisely what it says, that the judge must concur with the jury's
life recommendation unless 'the facts suggesting a sentence of
death [are] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable
person could differ." 2 '
During the survey period, the court seemed committed to keeping
the promise of Cochran, reversing all but one 2 " of the override
sentences that came before it. The court substantially ratified Tedder
in two cases. In the first, Cheshire v. State,2 5 the court subtly extended
Tedder by casting the sentencing judge's role as more like an appellate
court than a factfinder. In the second, Buford v. State,' it applied
Tedder even when there was a gulf of more than ten years between the
life verdict and the ultimate imposition of sentence.
Steven Cheshire was convicted of two counts of first degree mur-
der in the deaths of his estranged wife and a man with whom she was
living. Although the defense presented no mitigating evidence, the jury
rendered life verdicts as to both murders, but the trial court overrode
one of the verdicts, and imposed a death sentence for the wife's mur-
123. Cochran, 547 So. 2d at 933. The admission in Cochran that Tedder has not
been consistently applied in the past may bode ill for the continuing constitutionality of
the override procedure. In Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), the Court upheld
the procedure against a facial attack, but left open the question of whether it could
later be challenged upon a demonstration that it was applied in an arbitrary manner:
"We see nothing that suggests that the application of the jury-override procedure has
resulted in arbitrary or discriminatory application of the death penalty, either in gen-
eral or in this particular case. . . . [T]here is no evidence that the Florida Supreme
Court has failed in its responsibility to perform meaningful appellate review of each
death sentence, either in cases in which both the jury and the trial court have con-
cluded that death is the appropriate penalty or in cases when the jury has recom-
mended life and the trial court has overridden the jury's recommendation and sen-
tenced the defendant to death." 468 U.S. at 466. It may be that Cochran supplies the
evidence found lacking in Spaziano.
124. Zeigler v. State, 16 FLW S257 (Apr. 11, 1991).
125. 568 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1990).
126. 570 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1990).
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der.""7 On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reduced the sentence to
life imprisonment, finding that the jury could reasonably have ex-
tracted from the state's case evidence that could support a life sen-
tence. The court's approach was novel in that it discounted the judge's
rejection of controverted mitigating evidence.12 8 In a prior felony con-
viction override case, the court had accepted the trial court's rejection
of controverted mitigating evidence, apparently treating the trial court
judge as the ultimate factfinder. 129 In Cheshire, however, the court
seemed to consider it improper for the judge to make an independent
evaluation of the mitigating evidence, writing that "under Tedder, the
trial court's role is solely to determine whether the evidence in the rec-
ord was sufficient to form a basis upon which reasonable jurors could
rely in recommending life imprisonment."' 30 If followed in subsequent
cases, Cheshire will constitute a substantial advance toward regular-
izing the procedure by which trial court judges are to make sentencing
decisions in cases involving life verdicts.
Buford involved an unusual example of the vitality of a life ver-
dict. Robert Buford was convicted in 1978 for the rape and murder of a
seven-year-old girl. Although the jury rendered a life verdict, the trial
court imposed a death sentence. After lengthy litigation, resentencing
was ultimately ordered by a federal court on the ground that the trial
court had improperly limited its own consideration of mitigating evi-
dence.' When the case came up for resentencing more than ten years
after the original trial, a considerable amount of evidence was
presented to the judge that was not available to the 1978 jury. Noting
"the anomaly that the jury did not hear the additional mitigating evi-
dence which must be considered in determining whether the life recom-
127. Cheshire, 568 So. 2d at 910.
128. Id. at 911. Thus, the court wrote: "...there was some evidence that
Cheshire had been drinking at the time of the murder. Although the judge concluded
that Cheshire was not sufficiently intoxicated, we nevertheless must acknowledge that a
reasonable jury could have relied upon this evidence to conclude that Cheshire was not
in control of his faculties." Id.
129. In Thompson v. State, 553 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1989), the supreme court up-
held an override sentence where the trial judge rejected the testimony of a defense
psychiatrist that the defendant suffered from organic brain damage so that his capacity
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law was substantially impaired.
130. Cheshire, 568 So. 2d at 911.
131. Buford, 570 So. 2d at 924. The federal appeals court noted that the trial
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mendation was reasonable" and that the override had previously been
upheld on direct appeal, the court applied Tedder and found the over-
ride improper given the new evidence. 13 Thus, the supreme court held
that the presumption in favor of the life verdict continues to apply even
where the evidence presented to the judge differs considerably from the
evidence heard by the jury.'
. McCrae v. State,' extended the effect of Buford. James Mc-
Crae's override death sentence was initially affirmed in 1980,135 but the
sentence was eventually vacated because of a Hitchcock violation. 136 At
the new sentencing hearing, much of the new mitigating evidence in-
volved Mr. McCrae's life after he was initially sentenced to death:
"while i:n prison and receiving treatment, McCrae has demonstrated an
above-average intelligence and writing ability; has developed and evi-
denced strong spiritual and religious standards; has contributed to the
lives of others; has demonstrated a high potential for rehabilitation and
for making a contribution to the community; and has expressed sincere
remorse for his actions.' 3 7
Contrary to the foregoing cases is Zeigler v. State, 38 in which the
supreme court seemed to resort to the approach condemned in
Cochran. Under Cochran and like cases, the Florida Supreme Court
has looked to see whether the evidence could reasonably support the
jury's life verdict and has resolved conflicts in the evidence in favor of
the verdict. But in Zeigler, as in Thompson, the supreme court ac-
corded the judge's sentencing order the presumption of correctness, and
resolved conflicts in favor of the order rather than in favor of the ver-
dict. It approved the trial court's rejection of mitigating evidence re-
garding Mr. Zeigler's character and involvement in church and com-
munity activities noting that it found "no error in the weight the trial
132. Buford, 570 So. 2d at 924-25.
133. Douglas v. State, 575 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1991) involved a similar situation.
After convicting Mr. Douglas of a 1973 murder, the jury rendered a life verdict, which
the trial court overrode. After many years of litigation, a new sentencing hearing was
ordered at which a substantial amount of additional mitigating evidence was presented.
As in Buford, the supreme court reversed Mr. Douglas's resulting death sentence in
light of the additional mitigating evidence.
134. 582 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 1991).
135. McCrae v. State, 395 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1041
(1981).
136. McCrae v. State, 510 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1987).
137. 582 So. 2d at 616.
138. 580 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1991).
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judge assigned to this mitigating evidence. The judge could properly
consider the witnesses' relationships to the defendant and their personal
knowledge of his actions in deciding what weight to give to their
testimony. ' 1'39
C. The Sentencing Order
Section 921.141(3) of the Florida Statutes contemplates specific
factual findings of the trial court respecting mitigating evidence. It pro-
vides in pertinent part that the trial court shall produce written findings
upon which its sentence of death is based and also that there are insuf-
ficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating
circumstances.
In holding Section 921.141 constitutional in Proffitt v. Florida,"
the United States Supreme Court anticipated that this requirement of
written findings would result in meaningful appellate review and there-
fore prevent arbitrary application of the death penalty.' 4' Nevertheless,
the Florida Supreme Court has sometimes held in the past that there is
no requirement of specific findings as to nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances. 14 2
Eventually, the supreme court realized that the absence of specific
factual findings resulted in uneven application of the death penalty and
undertook to regularize the sentencing procedure. 14 3
During the early 1990s, the court struggled with the obvious ten-
sions between the principles espoused in Rogers and Proffitt and the
practice upheld in Mason.
139. Id. at 130.
140. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
141. Id. at 251.
142. E.g., Mason v. State, 438 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1051 (1984). The supreme court wrote: "The trial judge need not have expressly ad-
dressed each non-statutory mitigating factor in rejecting the same, and we will not
disturb his judgment simply because appellant disagrees with the conclusions reached."
Id. at 380. The court did not seem to consider the absence of such express findings to
be an impediment to its appellate review.
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1. Specific Findings Required
In Campbell v. State,144 the court took a hard line against the
Mason-sanctioned practice of not specifically considering mitigating
factors in the sentencing order. Observing that "our state courts con-
tinue to experience difficulty in uniformly addressing mitigating cir-
cumstances," the court established the following guidelines to clarify
the issue:
When addressing mitigating circumstances, the sentencing court
must expressly evaluate in its written order each mitigating cir-
cumstance proposed by the defendant to determine whether it is
supported by the evidence and whether, in the case of nonstatutory
factors, it is truly of a mitigating nature. See Rogers v. State, 511
So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020 (1988). The
court must find as a mitigating circumstance each proposed factor
that is mitigating in nature and has been reasonably established by
the greater weight of the evidence: "A mitigating circumstance
need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the defendant. If
you are reasonably convinced that a mitigating circumstance exists,
you may consider it as established." Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) at
81. The court next must weigh the aggravating circumstances
against the mitigating and, in order to facilitate appellate review,
must expressly consider in its written order each established miti-
gating circumstance. Although the relative weight given each miti-
gating factor is within the province of the sentencing court, a miti-
gating factor once found cannot be dismissed as having no weight.
To be sustained, the trial court's final decision in the weighing pro-
cess must be supported by "sufficient competent evidence in the
record." Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327, 1331 (Fla. 1981).
Hopefully, use of these guidelines will promote the uniform appli-
cation of mitigating circumstances in reaching the individualized
decision required by law. 145
144. :571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990).
145. Id. at 419-20. The quotation is from the opinion on rehearing. In the origi-
nal opinion, the clause between the citation to Rogers and the quotation from the stan-
dard jury instructions stated: "The Court must find as a mitigating circumstance each
proposed factor that has been reasonably established by the evidence and is mitigating
in nature". 15 Fla. L. Weekly at S344. It also included a footnote, since deleted, say-
ing, "We note that where uncontroverted evidence of a mitigating factor has been
presented, a reasonable quantum of competent proof is required before the factor can
be said to have been established." Id. at n.5.
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Although the foregoing raises questions, as discussed in this arti-
cle, it represents a fresh start toward regularizing consideration of miti-
gation; thus improving the quality of appellate review in capital cases.
Further, it addresses an issue that has been the source of some criti-
cism in the past: the rejection of unrebutted mitigating evidence. 14 6
2. Specific Findings Not Required
In other cases, the court declined to reverse sentencing orders
which did not comply with Campbell. Further, although Campbell
seems to be dictated by Proffitt and Rogers, the court has refused to
apply it to cases where the sentencing order preceded the court's deci-
sion in Campbell.
In Floyd v. State,4" which was decided three months after Camp-
bell, the court upheld a sentencing order, entered prior to Campbell, in
which the trial judge apparently said only the following about the miti-
gating evidence: "[tihis court [sic] heard everything at the sentencing
hearing that the Defendant chose to present. This court [sic] now finds
that sufficient mitigating circumstances which would require a lesser
penalty do not exist.' 114 8
Similarly, in Bruno v. State, 49 the court upheld a death sentence,
entered prior to Campbell, where there were three statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances and no statutory mitigating circumstances. In that
case there was no consideration of nonstatutory mitigation. 10 Bruno
146. See Waters, Uncontroverted Mitigating Evidence in Florida Capital
Sentencings, 63 FLA. B.J. 11 (1989). Of course, the general rule is that uncontradicted
evidence must be accepted as proof of a contested issue. E.g. M. Stevens Dry Dock v.
G & J Inv. Corp., 506 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (citing cases). In the
past, the court had declined to apply this elementary principle to capital sentencing.
See, e.g., Pope v. State, 441 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 1983) (approving of trial court's rejec-
tion of unrebutted evidence that defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress syn-
drome as a result of service in Viet Nam).
147. 569 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1990).
148. Id. at 1233 (emphasis in original).
149. 574 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1991)
150. Id. at 83. The trial court rejected evidence that Mr. Bruno was "extremely"
disturbed and suffered "substantial" impairment of his ability to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law, but apparently did not consider the nonstatutory cir-
cumstances of less than extreme disturbance and less than substantial impairment. The
supreme court has acknowledged the existence of such nonstatutory circumstances. See
Cheshire v. State, 568 So.2d 908, 912 (1990) (error to fail to consider nonstatutory
mitigation). Bruno contains no mention of Cheshire.
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does not reflect the express evaluation of nonstatutory circumstances
required by Campbell.
In yet another case, Gilliam v. State,5l the court wrote:
Appellant's penultimate argument is that the sentencing order does
not reflect reasoned judgment because it fails to enumerate the
statutory mitigating factors on which he presented evidence. We
find the sentencing order sufficient. The order recites the statutory
aggravating circumstances that were found proved, and the reasons
supporting the findings. The order also recites the nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances that the court found proved. In view of
the trial judge's findings regarding nonstatutory mitigating circum-
stances, we can assume he followed his own instructions to the jury
in considering the statutory mitigating circumstances, despite the
fact that he did not enumerate them. As we noted in Johnson v.
Dugger, 520 So. 2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1988): "When read in its en-
tirety, the sentencing order, combined with the court's instructions
to the jury, indicates that the trial court gave adequate considera-
tion to the evidence presented." Appellant nevertheless argues that
our recent decision in Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla.
1990), issued after the order under review was rendered, requires a
different result. Campbell directs that "the sentencing court must
expressly evaluate in its written order each mitigating circumstance
proposed by the defendant to determine whether it is supported by
the evidence and whether, in the case of nonstatutory factors, it is
truly of a mitigating nature." Id. at 419 (footnote omitted). It is
unnecessary for us to reach the question whether this order com-
plies, because Campbell is not a fundamental change of law requir-
ing retroactive application. As we said in Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d
922, 929 (Fla. 1990), only "fundamental and constitutional law
changes which cast serious doubt on the veracity or integrity of the
original trial proceeding" - in effect, "jurisprudential upheavals"
- require retroactive application; "evolutionary refinements" do
not.152
Taken literally, Gilliam seems to stand for the proposition that, if the
judge has instructed the jury to consider mitigating factors, then it is to
be assumed that the trial court has correctly considered mitigating fac-
tors. This proposition is in stark contrast to the observations in Rogers
and Campbell that trial courts are often confused in how to go about
151. 582 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1991).
152. Id. at 612 (emphasis in original).
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considering mitigating evidence. 15 3
Another case which seems directly contrary to Campbell is Sochor
v. State. 54 Dennis Sochor was convicted of first degree murder and
kidnapping in the strangling death of a young woman he met at a bar
on New Year's Eve. The only eyewitness testified that Mr. Sochor
looked like a man "possessed" at the time of the murder, and several
experts testified to Mr. Sochor's psychiatric problems. 155 Finding four
aggravating circumstances' 56 and no mitigating circumstances, the trial
court sentenced him to death. The Florida Supreme Court struck one
of the aggravating circumstances' 57 but upheld the death sentence be-
cause the supreme court determined that to strike one aggravating fac-
tor where there were no mitigating factors was not a cause for re-
sentencing. 158
As an initial matter, it is impossible to square the statement in
Sochor that evidence of childhood abuse can be ignored'59 with the
statements in Campbell'6 that, as a matter of law, an abused child-
hood is a "valid" mitigating circumstance and in Rogers'.' that the
sentencer must, as a matter of law, consider all mitigating circum-
stances. It is also impossible to square with those authorities the hold-
153. The court's unwillingness to apply Campbell to Mr. Gilliam's sentence on
the basis of Witt is somewhat puzzling. Witt involved a bar against collateral chal-
lenges to convictions and sentences. It did not purport to limit claims on direct appeal.
In Gilliam the court did not note this distinction.
154. 580 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1991). EDITOR'S NOTE: Subsequent to the.comple-
tion of this article, the United States Supreme Court vacated Dennis Sochor's death
sentence and remanded the case for further action. Mr. Sochor's attorney was the au-
thor of this article and successfully argued a violation of Sochor's Eighth Amendment
rights. Readers should refer to Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992). Any further
reference to Sochor should be taken in light of the court's opinion.
155. Id. at 599.
156. Id. The four circumstances were: that Mr. Sochor was previously convicted
of a violent felony, that the killing occurred while he was engaged in the commission of
a felony, that the killing was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, and that the killing
was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of
moral or legal justification.
157. Id. at 603. The circumstance that the killing was committed in a cold, cal-
culated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification
was struck.
158. Id. at 604.
159. "Deciding whether such family history establishes mitigating circumstances
is within the trial court's discretion." Id.
160. 571 So.2d at 419 n.4.
161. 511 So.2d at 534.
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ing in Sochor that it is discretionary with the judge and jury whether
to consider in mitigation evidence of a psychiatric disorder. 162
3. Other Sentencing Order Issues
Campbell is in keeping with a general trend toward improving the
procedures governing sentencing orders. During the survey period, the
supreme court continued to require that sentencing orders be rendered
at the time of sentencing " ' although it has declined to apply this re-
quirement to "pipeline" cases. 64 In keeping with the trend toward im-
proving sentencing procedures, the court reduced a death sentence to
life imprisonment in a case where the trial court's sentencing order
contained no findings as to individual aggravating or mitigating
factors.' 68
D. Aggravating Circumstances and Mitigating Evidence
1. Aggravating Circumstances
a. Sentence of Imprisonment
Under section 921.141(5)(a), the jury and judge may consider in
aggravation that the murder was committed by a person under sen-
tence of imprisonment. Although a strict construction of the statute
would be that the circumstance was directed at prison murders, cases
have construed this circumstance to apply to sentencing alternatives or
variations in which the defendant was not actually incarcerated at the
162. Sochor, 580 So. 2d at 604.
163. The court established this requirement in Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d
833 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989).
164. See Stewart v. State, 558 So. 2d 416 (1990). In Christopher v. State, 583
So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1991), the court reduced a death sentence to life imprisonment on this
ground where the sentencing hearing occurred after Grossman was decided.
165. In Bouie v. State, 559 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1990), the trial court's sentencing
order apparently said only the following by way of consideration of sentencing factors:
"The court has considered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented in
evidence in this cause and determines that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist,
and that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating
circumstances." Id. at 1116. The supreme court noted that the trial court's written
assessment of sentencing factors is necessary for meaningful appellate review: "A trial
judge's justifying a death sentence in writing provides 'the opportunity for meaningful
review' in this Court." Id.
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time of the murder.
In Haliburton v. State,' the evidence showed that Jerry
Haliburton committed a murder after being released from prison under
a program called "mandatory conditional release." This program (re-
ferred to as "MCR") involved release from prison after serving one's
term less allowable gain-time and other credits, with continuing super-
vision "subject to all statutes relating to parole."'1 7 The Florida Su-
preme Court upheld application of the imprisonment circumstance, by
analogy with previous cases upholding its application to parolees.'6 8
In Gunsby v. State, 69 the court extended the circumstance to
cover the time before the defendant actually began to serve his sen-
tence. In upholding Donald Gunsby's death sentence, the court wrote:
[T]he record clearly establishes that Gunsby had been sentenced to
incarceration but had not reported to jail as ordered and that a
warrant had been issued for his arrest. These circumstances justify
a finding that Gunsby was under a sentence of imprisonment at the
time of this offense. We reject the contention that there must be an
escape for this aggravating circumstance to apply, and we conclude
that this aggravating circumstance was properly found. See Songer
v. State, 544 So. 2d 1010 (Fla.1989)."'7
Haliburton and Gunsby were in keeping with a general trend
against strict construction of aggravating circumstances. As such, they
stand in marked contrast to Trotter v. State.17 In that case, the trial
court had applied the imprisonment circumstance where Melvin Trot-
ter committed a murder while released to a "community control" pro-
gram. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, writing:
Subsection 948.10(1), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that com-
munity control is "an alternative, community-based method to pun-
166. 561 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1990).
167. FLA. STAT. § 944.291 (1979).
168. Haliburton, 561 So. 2d at 252. The cases applying the circumstance to pa-
rolees stem from Aldridge v. State, 351 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 1977). Curiously, Mr. Al-
dridge did not contest this use of the circumstance, so the court was not called upon to
decide the propriety of its use.
169. 574 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 1991).
170. Id. at 1090. Mr. Songer "did not break out of prison but merely walked
away from a work-release job." 544 So. 2d at 1011. Gunsby certainly creates new law
if it holds that walking away is not escaping.
171. 576 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1990).
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ish an offender in lieu of incarceration." Moreover, we have held
that violation of probation is not an aggravating circumstance
probation is not equivalent to being under sentence of imprison-
ment, for the appellant was not incarcerated. Bolender v. State,
422 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1982), cert.denied, 461 U.S. 939 (1983); Fer-
guson v. State, 417 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1982); Peek v. State, 395 So.
2d 492 (Fla. 1980), cert.denied, 451 U.S. 964 (1981). Penal stat-
utes must be strictly construed in favor of the one against whom a
penalty is to be imposed. Reino v. State, 352 So. 2d 853 (Fla.
1977), receded from on other grounds, Perez v. State, 545 So. 2d
1357 (Fla. 1989). 171
b. Prior Violent Felony
Under section 921.141(5)(b) of the Florida Statutes, the sentenc-
ing jury and judge may consider as an aggravating circumstance that
the defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. For the first
eighteen years of this circumstance's existence, it was thought that it
did not apply to juvenile adjudications of delinquency for violent of-
fenses. But in 1990, the court suggested that it could apply to such
adjudications. In Campbell v. State,17 8 the court wrote, without further
discussion that the trial court "correctly found that Campbell was pre-
viously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence. He
cites no authority in support of his assertion that prior juvenile convic-
172. Id. at 694. Reino involved construction of a statute of limitation. Although
Trotter appears to be the first Florida case to apply the rule of strict construction to an
aggravating circumstance, the rule is hardly novel. Section 775.021(1), Florida Stat-
utes, sets out the rule for construing provisions of the Florida Criminal Code:
The provisions of this code and offenses defined by other statutes shall be
strictly construed; when the language is susceptible of differing construc-
tions, it shall be construed most favorably to the accused.
This principle, known as the "rule of lenity," is not merely a maxim of statutory con-
struction: it is rooted in fundamental principles of due process. Dunn v. United States,
442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979) (rule of lenity rooted in fundamental principles of due pro-
cess mandating that no individual be forced to speculate, at peril of indictment,
whether his conduct is prohibited. Thus, to ensure that a legislature speaks with special
clarity when marking the boundaries of criminal conduct, courts must decline to im-
pose punishment for actions that are not "plainly and unmistakably" proscribed). The
principle of strict construction of penal laws applies not only to interpretations of the
substantive ambit of criminal prohibitions, but also to the penalties they impose.
Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381 (1980).
173. 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990).
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tions cannot be considered in aggravation. ' 74 This somewhat cryptic
statement is remarkable because it is directly contrary to the principle
of strict construction of aggravating circumstances espoused seven days
later in Trotter. It is also contrary to indications in Young v. State,17 5
that it would be improper to consider the defendant's juvenile record.
In Young, the court held that there was no error in using a pre-sen-
tence investigation report where the trial court stated that it did not
rely on Mr. Young's juvenile record.1 76
Other recent cases involving this circumstance show uncertainty as
to its purpose and as to what evidence may be used to support it. For
example, in Stewart v. State,177 the court reiterated a prior interpreta-
tion that the purpose of the circumstance was to demonstrate violent
propensity: "Propensity to commit violent crimes surely must be a valid
consideration for the jury and the judge. 178 But violent propensity, per
se, is not an aggravating circumstance under the statute, and in Free-
man v. State,1 79 the court held it was improper for the prosecutor to
imply to the jury that the defendant was likely to commit future crimes
if not incarcerated. In Freeman, the court simply took no notice of
Stewart and Elledge.
Even more curious is the fact that Freeman overruled sub silentio
the portion of Elledge on which the court relied in Stewart. In Elledge,
the court had held admissible, as relevant to Mr. Elledge's propensity
to commit violent crimes, the testimony of the widow of a man he had
killed in the course of a prior violent felony. But in Freeman, the court
held that such testimony was impermissible under Booth v.
Maryland.'"0
On the other hand, the court wrote in Lucas v. State 81 "that
[tiestimony by the victims, or others, about prior crimes is admissible if
174. Id. at 418.
175. 579 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1991).
176. Id. at 725.
177. 558 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1990).
178. Id. at 419 (quoting Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998, 1001 (Fla. 1977)). In
Hallman v. State, 560 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1990) the supreme court suggested a purpose
the defense might have to present evidence regarding the facts of a prior violent felony,
writing that the jury could have concluded that the circumstance was "entitled to little
weight" given unrebutted evidence of the defendant's limited involvement in the prior
offense.
179. 563 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1990).
180. Id. at 75-76 (citing Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)).
181. 568 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1990).
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the defendant is given the opportunity to confront the witness. 1' 82 Lu-
cas cited, among other authorities, Rhodes v. State.'83 In Rhodes, the
court reached the odd conclusion that, although the confrontation
clause, applies to capital proceedings, the clause is not necessarily vio-
lated by the introduction of testimony founded on'hearsay provided by
persons whom the defendant cannot confront.'84 At the penalty phase
of Richard Rhodes' capital trial, the state produced the testimony of a
Nevada police captain. The trial court allowed the captain to testify
about his investigation of a violent felony committed by Mr. Rhodes,
and allowed him to play a tape of an interview with the victim of that
crime, who was* unable to travel to Florida to testify.185 The Florida
Supreme Court held that use of the tape violated the confrontation
clause, but ruled that the captain's testimony, manifestly based on
hearsay, was admissible because "the defendant [was] accorded a fair
opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements."' 186
c. Great Risk
Under section 921.141(5)(c), the jury may consider in aggravation
that the defendant "knowingly created a great risk of death to many
persons." The supreme court has in the past held that the circumstance
does not apply simply because bystanders are present at the time of the
murder.1 87 It has also held that the circumstance cannot be based on
mere possibilities. For instance, in White v. State,1 88 the defendant
committed six murders in a house. The trial court applied the great
risk circumstance, reasoning that anyone [such as a friend or delivery
person] coming to the house during the episode would have been in
danger. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that such specu-
lation could not support application of the circumstance.189
During the survey period, the court reached apparently contradic-
182. Id. at 21.
183. 547 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1989).
184. Id. at 1204.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1204-05. Rhodes is difficult to reconcile with Hitchcock v. State, 578
So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1990) in which the court upheld the exclusion, on hearsay grounds, of
the testimony of a defense witness at sentencing regarding interviews made during his
investigation of mitigation.
187. Kampff v. State, 371 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1979) (two bystanders present in
store when defendant shot ex-wife).
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tory results in two cases applying the circumstance. In Hallman v.
State,190 the evidence showed that Darrell Wayne Hallman engaged in
a gun battle with a security guard outside a bank which he had just
robbed. After shooting the guard, he hijacked an automobile, forcing
the driver to take him from the scene.' 9 ' The trial court applied the
great risk circumstance in sentencing Mr. Hallman, but the state su-
preme court disapproved of the finding:
Next Hallman attacks the finding that he knowingly created a
great risk of death to many persons. The trial court listed ten per-
sons who were in the area of the shoot-out and could have been
struck and remarked that the shoot-out occurred near a busy thor-
oughfare. Hallman argues that he and Hunick fired at each other
from close range and that none of the bullets was aimed in the
direction of a large number of people. At most, he maintains, there
was only the chance that a bystander would be struck by a stray
shot, and that such a danger is insufficient to support the aggravat-
ing circumstance.
Again, we agree with Hallman. We set out the standard for this
aggravating circumstance in Kampff v. State, 371 So. 2d 1007
(Fla. 1979). We said:
"Great risk" means not a mere possibility but a likeli-
hood or high probability. The great risk of death cre-
ated by the capital felon's actions must be to "many"
persons. By using the words "many" the legislature in-
dicated that a great risk of death to a small number of
people would not establish this aggravating
circumstance.
Id. at 1009-10. We have held that great risk of death to three peo-
ple was insufficient. Bello v. State, 547 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1989). The
state's reliance on Suarez v. State, 481 So. 2d 1201, 1209 (Fla.
1985), cert.denied, 476 U.S. 1178, 106 S. Ct. 2908, 90 L. Ed. 2d
994 (1986), is misplaced. In that case the defendant fired more
than a dozen shots in the area of a migrant labor camp, three per-
sons other than the victim were in the line of fire and his four
nearby accomplices ran the risk of death from return fire.
The trial judge referred to the presence of numerous people in the
bank, and passersby on busy U.S. 98 to support his finding. The




Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 11
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss3/11
Caldwell
evidence showed, however, that the seven persons in the bank ran
almost no risk of being struck, as they were behind partitions and
away from doors or windows and not in the line of fire. Five of the
witnesses outside the bank either saw or heard the shooting, but
only one of them was ever in the line of fire. It is true that there
were a number of passersby on U.S. 98, but of the eight shots only
one was definitely aimed in the direction of the highway and only
two others could have been. We do not believe that the possibility
that no more than three gunshots could have been fired toward a
busy highway is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Hallman
knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.1"2
The court was less indulgent in Van Poyck v. State,193 in which
the evidence showed that William Van Poyck and Frank Valdez, in an
unsuccessful attempt to free an inmate from a prison van, killed one
guard at close range, attempted to kill another at close range, and then,
in their flight from the scene fired numerous shots at the police cars in
pursuit, hitting three of them."' The Florida Supreme Court rejected
without discussion Mr. Van Poyck's argument against application of
the great risk circumstance. 9 5
On its face, Van Poyck seems at odds with Hallman. The evidence
recited in Van Poyck shows, at most, that several police officers were
endangered. It does not show a great risk to "many persons" as re-
quired by Hallman and Bello.
d. Felony Murder
Section 921.141(5)(d) provides for consideration as an aggravating
circumstance the fact that the murder was committed "while the de-
fendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or
an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to com-
mit, any robbery, sexual battery, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or air-
craft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a de-
structive device or bomb."1 96
In Holton v. State,9 ' the court seemed to expand this circum-
192. Id. at 225-26.
193. 564 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1990).
194. Id.
195. Id. In all, the court rejected fifteen penalty arguments without comment,
and discussed only one penalty issue at length on Mr. Van Poyck's appeal.
196. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(d) (1991).
197. 573 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1990).
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stance. The evidence at Rudolph Holton's trial showed that the dece-
dent was already dead at the time of the sexual union. 198 Therefore,
under prior case law, there was no sexual battery. Nevertheless, the
court upheld Mr. Holton's sexual battery conviction on the theory that
Mr. Holton may have thought that the woman was still alive. The
court extended this novel principle to the felony murder aggravating
circumstance, upholding its application to Mr. Holton. 1"
e. Avoiding Arrest
The sentencer may consider in aggravation that the murder "was
committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or
effecting an escape from custody."2 ' In some cases, the Florida Su-
preme Court has held the state to a high burden of proof and has
stricken the circumstance where it would otherwise arguably apply.2"'
At other times, though, under seemingly similar circumstances, it has
upheld the circumstance.02 At least where a law enforcement officer
has not been killed, the court will uphold the circumstance only where
there is "strong proof" that avoiding arrest by eliminating a witness
was the sole or dominant motive for the murder.20 3 During the survey
period, the supreme court did not undertake to further define the cir-
cumstance. But in Derrick v. State,2 4 the supreme court did discuss its
relationship to the premeditation circumstance.
In Derrick, Samuel Jason Derrick murdered Rama Sharma during
a robbery. He killed Mr. Sharma to "shut him up" when he started
screaming."05 In sentencing Mr. Derrick to death, the trial court em-ployed both the premeditation and the avoiding arrest circumstances.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(e) (1991).
201. E.g., Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 360 (Fla. 1988) (evidence insufficient
to prove circumstance even though victim was on phone with operator asking for the
police at the time she was shot); Perry v. State, 522 So. 2d 817, 820 (Fla. 1988) (no
direct evidence of motive; defendant may have merely panicked when committing
robbery).
202. E.g., Harmon v. State, 527 So. 2d 182, 188 (Fla. 1988) (defendant became
frightened when decedent spoke his name, indicating that decedent could identify him);
Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270, 276 (Fla. 1988) (circumstantial evidence of exis-
tence of witness elimination sufficient).
203. See, e.g., Perry, 522 So. 2d at 817.
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The Florida Supreme Court disapproved:
The trial judge found that the murder was cold, calculated, and
premeditated and that the murder was committed for the purpose
of avoiding arrest. Under the facts as the judge found them, it ap-
pears to this Court that it is inconsistent to find that both of these
factors apply. In finding that the murder was committed to prevent
lawful arrest, the judge relied on Derrick's confession that he had
to kill Sharma after Sharma recognized him. Yet, the judge also
found the murder to be cold, calculated and premeditated because
Derrick hid in the bushes with a knife waiting for Sharma and then
chased Sharma twenty feet after the original attack to finish killing
him. If Derrick did not decide to kill Sharma until Sharma recog-
nized him, then it seems unlikely that the facts would support the
finding of the heightened premeditation necessary to find the mur-
der was cold, calculated, and premeditated. 0 6
f Pecuniary Gain
The aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed for
pecuniary gain 20 7 usually arises where the murder occurs during a rob-
bery or burglary, in which case it is "merged" with the felony murder
circumstance, so that the two become a single circumstance. 08 In two
recent cases, the trial judges merged the pecuniary gain circumstance
with the premeditation circumstance. In Downs v. State,20 9 which in-
volved a contract murder, the trial court judge reasoned that the two
circumstances would have to be established in every such case, so that
they should be treated as one. 21 0 And, in Anderson v. State, 1 the
judge treated them as one where there was a prearranged design to
commit robbery and murder.21 2
206. Id.
207. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(f) (1991).
208. E.g. Bruno v. State, 574 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1991). The jury instructions do not
inform the jury of this merger doctrine, and the supreme court upheld the denial of a
requested jury instruction on the issue in Mendyk v. State, 545 So. 2d 846, 849 (Fla.
1989). Hence, juries consistently apply the circumstance in an incorrect manner.
209. 572 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1990).
210. Id. at 898 n.3.
211. 574 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1991).
212. Id. at 90 n.2.
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g. Hindering Law Enforcement
The law enforcement circumstance 213 also usually disappears from
consideration, being merged with the avoid arrest circumstance. 14
h. Heinousness
As noted in this article, the survey period saw no end to contro-
versy regarding the heinousness circumstance. In addition to addressing
or avoiding questions regarding jury instructions, the Florida Supreme
Court experimented with formulae for application of the circumstance.
In Porter v. State,21 the evidence showed that after threatening
his estranged lover, Evelyn Williams, George Porter, Jr. shot and killed
her in the hallway of her home early one morning. Mr. Porter then
threatened the woman's daughter, at which point the woman's new
lover, Walter Burrows, entered the room, struggled with Mr. Porter,
and forced him outside. Mr. Porter apparently shot Mr. Burrows in the
yard. The opinion discloses no further details about the shootings.1 6
After Mr. Porter plead guilty to two counts of first degree murder and
separate counts of armed burglary and aggravated assault, sentencing
proceedings were held before a jury, which recommended death
sentences in both murders. Finding, among other things, that the mur-
der of Ms. Williams was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, the
trial court sentenced Mr. Porter to death for that offense. 17 On appeal,
the Florida Supreme Court wrote, regarding the heinousness
circumstance:
Porter next argues that Williams' murder was not especially hei-
nous, atrocious, or cruel. In the seminal case of State v. Dixon, 283
So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943, 94 S. Ct. 1950, 40
L. Ed. 2d 295 (1974), the Court addressed the meaning of "espe-
cially heinous, atrocious or cruel":
It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely
wicked or shockingly evil; that atrocious means outra-
213. "The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise
of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws." FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (5)(g)
(1991).
214. E.g. Valle v. State, 581 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1991).
215. 564 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1990).
216. Id.
217. Id. The court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for the Burrows mur-
der, finding that the aggravating circumstances were merely "technical."
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geously wicked and vile; and, that cruel means designed
to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference
to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others. What
is intended to be included are those capital crimes
where the actual commission of the capital felony was
accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime
apart from the norm of capital felones - the con-
scienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily tor-
turous to the victim.
'We agree that the murder of Williams did not stand apart from
the norm of capital felonies, nor did it evince extraordinary cruelty.
*We see little distinction between this case and Amoros v. State,
.531 So. 2d 1256, 1261 (Fla. 1988), wherein the Court struck the
trial court's finding of especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel on a
finding that the murderer fired three shots into the victim at close
range. Moreover, this record is consistent with the hypothesis that
Porter's was a crime of passion, not a crime that was meant to be
deliberately and extraordinarily painful. The state has not met its
burden of proving this factor beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
trial court erred in finding to the contrary. 18
Similarly, in Cheshire v. State,119 the court wrote:
As his third issue, Cheshire argues that the trial court improperly
found the aggravating factor of heinous, atrocious or cruel. We
agree. The factor of heinous, atrocious or cruel is proper only in
torturous murders - those that evince extreme and outrageous de-
pravity as exemplified either by the desire to inflict a high degree
of pain or utter indifference to or enjoyment of the suffering of
another. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973). The physical
evidence simply does not support such a finding here. At best, we
can only conjecture as to the exact events of the murder. Since the
evidence at hand is entirely consistent with a quick murder com-
mitted in the heat of passion, we believe the state has failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the factor of heinous, atro-
cious or cruel existed. 20
From the foregoing, it would seem that the heinousness circum-
218. Id. at 1063 (emphasis in original).
219. 568 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1990).
220. Id. at 912.
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stance applies only where the murderer intended that the killing be de-
liberately and extraordinarily painful.2 1 But in Hitchcock v. State,""
the court reached an opposite conclusion. In 1977, a jury convicted
James Ernest Hitchcock of first degree murder based on evidence that
he had sexual intercourse with his brother's thirteen-year-old step-
daughter and then choked and beat her to death when she said she was
going to tell her mother.223 On habeas corpus review, the United States
Supreme Court held that the sentencing jury and judge had been im-
properly limited in the consideration of mitigating evidence. ' At re-
sentencing, the jury recommended imposition of the death sentence.
The trial court imposed that sentence, finding among other things, that
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. On appeal, the
Florida Supreme Court rejected Mr. Hitchcock's challenge to this
finding:
That Hitchcock might not have meant the killing to be unnecessa-
rily torturous does not mean that it actually was not unnecessarily
torturous and, therefore, not heinous, atrocious, or cruel. This ag-
gravator pertains more to the victim's perception of the circum-
stances than to the perpetrator's. Stano v. State, 460 So. 2d 890
(Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111 (1985). Hitchcock stated
that he kept "chokin' and chokin' " the victim, and hitting her,
both inside and outside the house, until she finally lost conscious-
ness. Fear and emotional strain can contribute to the heinousness
of a killing. Adams v. State, 412 So. 2d 850 (Fla.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 882 (1982). As Hitchcock concedes in his brief,
"[s]trangulations are nearly per se heinous." See Doyle v. State,
460 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1984); Adams; Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d
533 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923 (1976). The court did
not err in finding this murder to have been heinous, atrocious, or
cruel. 225
221. Porter and Cheshire are difficult to square with the many cases applying the
circumstance where the defendant has repeatedly stabbed, or has violently throttled,
the decedent in a berserk frenzy with little or no evidence of torturous intent. E.g.
Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990) (defendant repeatedly stabbed dece-
dent) and Rivera v. State, 561 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1990) (while under extreme distur-
bance defendant strangled decedent).
222. 578 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1990).
223. Hitchcock v. State, 413 So. 2d 741, 743 (Fla.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 960
(1982).
224. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987).
225. Hitchcock, 578 So. 2d at 692-93.
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Thus, in Hitchcock, the court wrote that torturous intent was not
necessary to application of the circumstance, without any mention of
Porter and Cheshire, which had emphasized the necessity of such an
intent. The tension between these cases is typical of the caselaw regard-
ing this circumstance. Hitchcock, Cheshire and Porter show that the
court is still far from finding uniform rules for its application.""
i. Premeditation
The premeditation circumstance22 7 was promulgated in 1979 in
apparent response to a controversy regarding whether the heinousness
circumstance applied where there was an "execution-type killing. 2 28
The Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the circumstance has
varied considerably from case to case. Commentator Jonathan Kennedy
has written that the decisions on the circumstance through 1987 re-
sulted in "a fully incoherent pattern." 29 The supreme court sought to
narrow. application of the circumstance in Rogers v. State,230 holding
that the "calculated" element required "heightened premeditation,"
meaning "a careful plan or prearranged design. 231 Cases during the
survey period reflect the tension between the narrowing construction in
Rogers and the court's previous tendency to read the circumstance
broadly.
i. Reloading or Rearming
P:rior to 1990, the Florida Supreme Court had held with middling
226. Two cases decided on the same day highlight the problem. In Sochor v.
State, 580 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1991), the supreme court focused only on the decedent's
state of mind: "The evidence supports the conclusion of horror and contemplation of
serious injury or death by the victim." But in McKinney v. State, 579 So. 2d 80 (Fla.
1991), the focus was on the defendant's state of mind: "The evidence does not show
that the defendant intended to torture the victim."
227. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(i),(1991).
228. For the history of the circumstance, see Kennedy and Barnard, supra note
77.
229. Jonathan Kennedy, Florida's "Cold, Calculated and Premeditated" Aggra-
vating Circumstance in Death Penalty Cases, 17 STET. L. REV. 47 (1987).
230. 511 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1987).
231. Id. at 533. Subsequently, the supreme court suggested in Porter v. State,
564 So. 2d 1060, 1063-64 (Fla. 1990) that the Constitution requires the narrowing
construction given in Rogers. But in Eutzy v. State, 541 So. 2d 1143, 1147 (Fla. 1989),
the court characterized the Rogers construction as "a mere evolutionary refinement in
the law," so as not to be applied retroactively.
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consistency that the premeditation circumstance may be established by
proof that the murderer rearmed himself or reloaded his weapon before
delivering the fatal wound.2 32 In two 1990 cases, the court refused to
expand, and then eliminated, this body of law.
In Campbell v. State,23 3 the evidence showed that James Campbell
went to a house with the intent of robbing the occupants, who were
apparently unknown to him. Sue Zann Bosler, who was in the bath-
room at that time, heard the doorbell ring and then heard her father,
Billy, grunting and groaning. When she came out, Mr. Campbell, who
had been stabbing the father, attacked and stabbed her. After he
stabbed Ms. Bosler, Mr. Campbell then resumed the attack on her fa-
ther, who thereafter died from his injuries.23' On appeal from Mr.
Campbell's conviction and death sentence, the supreme court disap-
proved of the use of the premeditation circumstance:
We disagree with the court's finding that the stabbing was commit-
ted in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner. The state ar-
gues that because Campbell stabbed Billy, then stopped when he
attacked Sue Zann, and then returned to stabbing Billy, he had
time to reflect upon and plan his resumed attack on Billy. See
Swafford v. State, 533 So.2d 270 (Fla.1988), cert. denied, 109
S.Ct. 1578 (1989) (cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating
circumstance present where defendant shot victim, reloaded, then
resumed shooting). This factor generally is reserved for cases show-
ing "a careful plan or prearranged design." Rogers v. State, 511
So.2d 526, 533 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020 (1988).
Campbell's actions took place over one continuous period of physi-
cal attack. His assault on Sue Zann provided him with no respite
during which he could reflect upon or plan his resumption of attack
on Billy, unlike the situation in Swafford wherein the act of reload-
ing the gun provided a break in the attack.211
Although one might wonder how reloading a weapon, without
more, shows "a careful plan or prearranged design," Farinas v.
State,2 36 rendered such speculation unnecessary. There, the court re-
jected the application of the premeditation circumstance where Alberto
Farinas had to unjam his pistol three times before firing the fatal bul-
232. See Kennedy, supra note 229, at 88-92.
233. 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 418.
236. 569 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1990).
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lets while his estranged lover lay helpless on the ground. The court re-
jected the state's reliance on cases involving reloading, and overruled
the reloading cases in a footnote:
The state's reliance upon Phillips v. State, 476 So. 194 (Fla.1985),
is misplaced. In Phillips, this Court held that because appellant
had to reload his revolver in order for all of the shots to be fired, he
was afforded ample time to contemplate his actions and choose to
kill his victim, and the record therefore amply supported the find-
ing that the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated. Our
decision in Phillips, however, was predicated on Herring v. State,
446 So.2d 1049 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 989 (1984). We re-
ceded from this portion of Herring in our decision in Rogers v.
State, 511 So.2d 526 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 733
(1988).237
ii. The Cold, Calculated Crime of Passion
Rogers did not purport to define the other elements of the circum-
stance ("cold," "premeditated," and "without a pretense of moral or
legal justification"). As the statute is written, the state should have to
prove these additional elements even where the murder was "calcu-
lated" as defined in Rogers.2 38 In subsequent cases, the court seems to
have missed this point and simply considered a showing of such a plan
or design sufficient to establish the circumstance without more.
It would stand to reason that a crime of passion would not satisfy
the "cold"2 ' element of the premeditation circumstance. Thus in
Mitchell v. State,24 0 the court wrote:
We recently defined the cold, calculated and premeditated factor
as requiring a careful plan or prearranged design. Rogers v. State,
511 So.2d 526 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 108 S.Ct.
733, 98 L.Ed.2d 681 (1988). The medical examiner testified that
the number of stab wounds and the force with which they were
delivered were consistent with a killing consummated by one in a
237. Id.
238. 511 So. 2d at 533.
239. Webster defines "in cold blood" as "without the excuse of passion; with
deliberation." WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 354 (Deluxe 2d
ed.)
240. 527 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1988).
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rage. A rage is inconsistent with the premeditated intent to kill
someone, and there was no other evidence of premeditation. Ac-
cordingly, we reverse the trial court on the finding that the murder
was cold, calculated and premeditated." 1
But in Porter v. State,2 "2 the supreme court upheld the application
of the circumstance to "a crime of passion." It may be remembered
from the discussion of the heinousness circumstance that, in Porter, the
supreme court struck down application of that circumstance because
the evidence was consistent with the theory that Porter's crime was one
of passion. However, notwithstanding this finding, the supreme court
upheld the application of the premeditation circumstance:
The Court has adopted the phrase "heightened premeditation" to
distinguish this aggravating circumstance from the premeditation
element of first-degree murder. See, e.g., Hamblen v. State, 527
So. 2d 800, 805 (Fla. 1988); Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d 526, 533
(Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020, 108 S.Ct. 733, 98
L.Ed.2d 681 (1988). Heightened premeditation can be demon-
strated by the manner of the killing, but the evidence must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant planned or arranged
to commit murder before the crime began. Hamblen, 527 So.2d at
805; Rogers, 511 So.2d at 533. See, e.g., Koon v. State, 513 So.2d
1253 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 943, 108 S.Ct. 1124, 99
L.Ed.2d 284 (1988). Hamblen and Rogers show that heightened
premeditation does not apply when a perpetrator intends to commit
an armed robbery of a store but ends up killing the store clerk in
the process. Nor does it apply when a killing occurs during a fit of
rage because "rage is inconsistent with the premeditated intent to
kill someone," unless there is other evidence to prove heightened
premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt. Mitchell v. State, 527
So.2d 179, 182 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 960, 109 S.Ct. 404,
102 L.Ed.2d 392 (1988). This is not a case involving a sudden fit of
rage. Porter previously had threatened to kill Williams and her
daughter. He watched Williams' house for two days just before the
murders. Apparently he stole a gun from a friend just to kill Wil-
liams. Then he told another friend that she would be reading about
him in the newspaper. While Porter's motivation may have been
grounded in passion, it is clear that he contemplated this murder
241. Id. at 182; see also Thompson v. State, 565 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 1990).
242. 564 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1990). Porter and Thompson were decided the same
day, but make no mention of each other.
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well in advance.2 43
Thus, in Porter the court substituted one element of the circumstance,
"calculated", 2 ' for the entire circumstance.
iii. The Unreasonable Pretense
In Banda v. State, 5 the court interpreted the "without any pre-
tense of moral or legal justification" portion of the circumstance as
follows:
Florida law requires that, before a murder can be deemed cold,
calculated, and premeditated, it must be committed "without any
pretense of moral or legal justification." § 921.141(5)(i), Fla.Stat.
(1985). The state must prove this last element beyond a reasonable
doubt, in addition to the other elements of this particular aggravat-
ing factor. See Jent v. State, 408 So.2d 1024, 1032 (Fla.1981),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1111, 102 S.Ct. 2916, 73 L.Ed.2d 1322
(1982).
Our decisions in the past have established general contours for the
meaning of the word "pretense" as it applies to capital sentencings.
For instance, we have held that a "pretense" of moral or legal jus-
tification existed where the defendant consistently had made state-
ments that he had killed the victim only after the victim jumped at
him and where no other evidence existed to disprove this claim.
Cannady v. State, 427 So.2d 723, 730-31 (Fla.1983). We reached
this conclusion even though the accused himself, an obviously inter-
ested party, was the only source of this testimony.
On the other hand, we have upheld the trial court's finding that no
"pretense" existed where the defendant's statements were wholly
irreconcilable with the facts of the murder. Thus, we have upheld a
finding that no pretense existed where the accused said the victim
intended to kill him over a $15.00 debt, but where the evidence
showed that the victim had never been violent or threatening and
243. Id. at 1064.
244. In Hamblen v. State, 527 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1988), the supreme court quoted
at length from the portion of Rogers defining "calculated" as involving a prearranged
design or plan. Both Hamblen and Rogers involved killings during the course of rob-
beries. Koon v. State, 513 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1987), also did not involve a "crime of
passion". Mr. Koon killed a person who was going to testify against him in a counter-
feiting case. Hence, none of those cases involved any question regarding the "cold"
element.
245. 536 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1988).
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had been attacked by surprise and stabbed repeatedly. Williamson
v. State, 511 So.2d 289, 293 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, - U.S.
-, 108 S.Ct. 1098, 99 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988).
We conclude that, under the capital sentencing law of Florida, a
"pretense of justification" is any claim of justification or excuse
that, though insufficient to reduce the degree of homicide, never-
theless rebuts the otherwise cold and calculating nature of the
homicide.4 6
In two cases during the survey period, the supreme court upheld
application of the premeditation circumstance where the record showed
some claim of legal or moral justification of the offense.
In Pardo v. State,2 47 Manuel Pardo, Jr., a former police officer,
was charged with killing nine people over a four-month period. Mr.
Pardo admitted killing these persons but said he should avoid culpabil-
ity "because he believed all the victims to be drug dealers, who 'have
no right to life.' "28 The court affirmed application of the premedita-
tion circumstance without discussion of this claim of justification.
In Gunsby v. State,4 9 the evidence showed that a friend was hos-
pitalized after an altercation with an Iranian proprietor of a nearby
grocery store. Announcing that he was "tired of those damn Iranians
messing with the black," Donald Gunsby went to the grocery store with
a shotgun and killed the brother of the man who had hurt his friend.25 0
The supreme court rejected Mr. Gunsby's assertion that his delusion of
being a protector of the black community formed a pretense of moral
or legal justification so that the premeditation circumstance should not
apply:
Gunsby claims that the trial judge erred in finding that the murder
was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner
without any pretense of moral or legal justification. Gunsby asserts
that his delusion that he was a protector of the black community
helped form a pretense of justification which renders this aggravat-
ing factor inapplicable. We disagree. The record is clear that Gun-
sby himself was never harassed or threatened in any way by the
victim or by the victim's brother. In fact, the evidence reflects that
Gunsby's delusion seemed to be directed toward ridding his neigh-
246. Id. at 224-25.
247. 563 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1990).
248. Id. at 78.
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borhood of drug dealers. However, this murder was not predicated
upon the fact that the victim was a drug dealer. We find that there
exists no reasonable pretense of moral or legal justification under
the circumstances of this case. Further, we find that this record
clearly supports the heightened premeditation necessary to support
this aggravating circumstance.25'
In requiring that the pretense be reasonable, the court did not dis-
cuss the Banda definition of "pretense" as something alleged or be-
lieved on slight grounds; an unwarranted assumption.
iv. Slightly Heightened Premeditation
"Simple premeditation of the type necessary to support a convic-
tion for first-degree murder is not sufficient to sustain a finding that a
killing was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated man-
ner. ' 25'1 In Holton v. State,2 53 evidence showed that Rudolph Holton
bound and garrotted Katrina Grady with pieces of nylon cloth.25' One
might imagine that this method of killing would involve a level of cold-
ness and calculation sufficient to satisfy the premeditation circum-
stance, but the Florida Supreme Court disapproved of its application,
stating that the strangulation "could have been a spontaneous act in
response to the victim's refusal to participate in consensual sex."2 55
It would obviously be impossible to define the point at which "sim-
ple" premeditation becomes "heightened" such that the premeditation
circumstance applies. Several cases indicate that the premeditation
must have preceded the defendant's encounter with the decedent. The
supreme court has repeatedly held that Rogers requires that the de-
fendant "plan or arrange to commit murder before the crime be-
gins."2 58 In McKinney v. State,257 the supreme court rejected the trial
251. Id.
252. Holton v. State, 573 So. 2d 284, 292 (Fla. 1990). But see Valle v. State,
581 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1991), holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not bar retroac-
tive application of the circumstance because it "only reiterated" the premeditation of
first degree murder.
253. 573 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1990).
254. Id. at 292. Apparently the evidence showed that Ms. Grady was aware of
the strangulation.
255. Id.
256. McKinney v. State, 579 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1991); see also Hamblen v. State,
527 So.2d 800 (Fla.1988) (angered when robbery victim set off alarm, defendant
forced her into another room and shot her; error to find premeditation circumstance).
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court's application of the premeditation circumstance. The evidence
showed that Franz Patella stopped his car to ask Boris McKinney, a
stranger, for directions. Mr. McKinney then jumped into Mr. Patella's
car, hit him, and ordered him to drive to an overpass two blocks away.
The entire sequence "took only minutes."25 8 In striking the circum-
stance, the supreme court stated that there was no evidence that Mr.
McKinney "planned to commit any crime at all until the opportunity
presented itself. Since this crime occurred only through a chance en-
counter, the evidence does not rise to the level of 'heightened premedi-
tation' required by this circumstance. 259
McKinney and Holton, lead one to think that the premeditation
circumstance could not apply where the defendant kills a police officer
during a routine traffic stop lasting only a few minutes. Farinas adds
support to such a conclusion. There, the court held that evidence show-
ing the defendant abducted his estranged lover and shot and killed her
when she tried to escape even though it took him several moments to
unjam his gun was insufficient to support a conclusion of premedita-
tion.2 0 The supreme court thought otherwise in Valle v. State."'1 Upon
being stopped for a traffic violation, Manuel Valle told his companion
that he was going to waste the officer. He then walked over to the pa-
trol car and shot the officer.262 The trial court noted that "approxi-
mately 2 to 5 minutes [had] elapsed from the time the defendant left
Officer Pena's car to get the gun and slowly walk back to shoot and kill
Officer Pena.1'263 Without any mention of Rogers, the supreme court
breathed old life into new law by relying on the reloading cases of
Swafford and Phillips in upholding the trial court's finding.
j. Law Enforcement Officers and Public Officials
The remaining two aggravating circumstances allow consideration
of the decedent's status as a law enforcement officer2 64 or a public offi-
257. 579 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1991).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See Farinas v. State, 569 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1990).
261. 581 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1991). Although decided on the same day as McKinney,
Valle contains no mention of the principles set out there.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. "The victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in
the performance of his official duties." FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)0) (1991).
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cial. 65 The law enforcement officer circumstance has never been used
independently of the other law enforcement circumstances (avoiding
arrest and hindering law enforcement), 266 and the public official cir-
cumstance has apparently never been used.
2. Mitigating Evidence
Since the promulgation of Section 921.141, there has been consid-
erable litigation regarding the nature of mitigation and the concept of
"mitigating circumstances." As already noted, the consideration of mit-
igation was originally limited to the statutory mitigating circumstances.
The process by which the trial court is to determine the existence of
mitigation was not rationalized until Rogers and Campbell [observing
that "our state courts continue to experience difficulty in uniformly ad-
dressing mitigating circumstances"] and the supreme court has not al-
lowed jury instructions on various nonstatutory circumstances. As dis-
cussed above, the supreme court reached diametrically opposed results
in Nixon [sentence for other offenses not relevant to defendant's "char-
acter, prior record, or the circumstances of the crime]) and Jones [sen-
tence for other offense constituted factor that might cause jury to de-
cline to impose the death sentence]. Other cases during the survey
period show similar confusion about the mitigation process.
In Floyd v. State,267 the defendant unsuccessfully sought to argue
to the jury the absence of various aggravating circumstances as mitiga-
tion. The Florida Supreme Court, in upholding the trial court's ruling,
relied on the holding in Stewart v. State.268 In so ruling, the supreme
265. "The victim of the capital felony was an elected or appointed public official
engaged in the performance of appointed public official engaged in the performance of
his official duties if the motive for the capital felony was related, in whole or in part, to
the victim's official capacity." FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(k) (Supp. 1990).
266. Valle v. State, 581 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1991). Although this circumstance was
merged by the trial court with the other two law enforcement circumstances, the su-
preme court wrote that its retroactive application would not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause because it duplicated those circumstances.
267. 569 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1990).
268. 549 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3294 (1990). In Stew-
art, the court wrote:
The trial court properly rejected Stewart's confusing request that the jury
be instructed on all possible aggravating factors so that he could argue
that the absence of many of these factors was a reason for imposing a
lesser sentence. Florida Standard Jury Instructions state that the jury be
instructed only on those factors for which evidence has been presented.
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court ignored the fact that, in the past, it had used the absence of ag-
gravating circumstances in support of its decision to reverse a death
sentence, 2 9 and made no mention in Jones that mitigation consists of
anything that might support a life sentence. Since the court has
stressed that the death penalty is to be reserved for the least mitigated
and most aggravated of murders, ' 2 70 it stands to reason that absence of
aggravating circumstances will take a murder from the class of "most
aggravated" murders and, therefore, support a life sentence. In its sum-
mary discussion in Floyd, the supreme court does not seem to have
considered these matters.
In Campbell v. State,27 ' the supreme court introduced the notion
of "categories" of nonstatutory mitigation. Its nonexclusive list some-
what arbitrarily differentiates between "contribution to community or
society" (category 2) and "charitable or humanitarian deeds" (cate-
gory 5), and also differentiates between the preceding two and "poten-
tial for rehabilitation" (category 3). Furthermore, it does not list the
most powerful of all mitigating circumstances; that the killing was the
product of a heated domestic confrontation.272
Perhaps more important is the question of how the categories fit
into the equation resulting in the sentencing decision. Although the
Fla.Std.Jury Instr. (Crim.) 78 (1981).
Id. at 174.
269. Fitzpatrick v. State, 527 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1988) (defendant took hostages
and killed deputy who arrived and pointed gun at him; reversing death sentence, court
observed that "the aggravating circumstances of heinous, atrocious and cruel, and cold,
calculated and premeditated are conspicuously absent." Id. at 812).
270. Songer v. State, 544 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1989).
271. 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990).
272. Usually without recognizing this as a mitigating factor (the court typically
addresses it in the context of proportionality review), the court has repeatedly asserted
its importance. E.g., Blakely v. State, 561 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1990) ("'[T]his Court
[has] stated that when the murder is a result of a heated domestic confrontation, the
death penalty is not proportionally warranted.' Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 361
(Fla. 1988). We have expressly applied this proportionality review to reverse the death
penalty in a number of domestic cases. On the other hand, we have affirmed the death
sentence under express proportionality review where the defendant has been convicted
of a prior 'similar violent offense.' In the instant case, Blakely had committed no prior
similar crime. The killing resulted from an ongoing and heated domestic dispute and
was factually comparable to that in Ross v. State, 474 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1985),
wherein the husband bludgeoned the wife to death with a hammer or other blunt in-
strument. We reversed the death penalty there on proportionality grounds.") In Doug-
las v. State, 575 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1991), the court did (perhaps for the first time)
specifically refer to a domestic relationship as a mitigating circumstance.
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court often states that the sentencing decision is not to be reached by
merely counting the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 273 the
number of circumstances is often of great importance in appellate deci-
sions. For instance, the court will rarely uphold a death sentence where
there is only a single aggravating circumstance.27' Similarly, it will
rarely reverse a death sentence where there are no mitigating circum-
stances.2 71 In the eighteen cases in which death sentences were affirmed
on direct appeal, the supreme court approved of an average of just over
three aggravating circumstances per case. In those same eighteen cases,
there was an average of between one and two mitigating circumstances
[whether statutory or nonstatutory] found per case. Numbers do seem
to count for quite a bit.
The question of how the "categories" of mitigation count is of
much practical importance. How these "categories" fit into the sentenc-
ing calculus is open to question. On the one hand, a broad "category,"
such as category 2 ("contribution to community or society") may sub-
sume a variety of nonstatutory "circumstances" (such as "exemplary
work, military, family, or other record") which might count as several
"circumstances" but as only one "category." On the other hand, a sin-
gle "circumstance" (exemplary work record) may fit into two "catego-
ries" ("contribution to community or society" and "potential for reha-
bilitation"). Presumably further litigation will be needed to determine
how the "categories" are to be used.
273. E.g. White v. State, 403 So. 2d 331, 336 (Fla. 1981). The standard jury
instructions do not inform the jurors of this principle.
274. In 1990, the supreme court reversed all three death sentences to come
before it on direct appeal in which the trial court found only one aggravating circum-
stance. Morris v. State, 557 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1990), Thompson v. State, 565 So. 2d 1311
(Fla. 1990), Nibert v. State, 574 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1990). Section 921.141(2)(a)
speaks of a determination of whether "sufficient aggravating circumstances exist." FLA.
STAT. § 921.141(2)(a) (1991). Taken literally, the use of the plural should forbid a
death sentence where there is but one aggravating circumstance.
275. In 1990, the court upheld all eight death sentences to come before it on
direct appeal where the trial court found no mitigation. Reed v. State, 560 So. 2d 203
(Fla. 1990), Ventura v. State, 560 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1990), Haliburton v. State, 561 So.
2d 248 (Fla. 1990), Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060 (Fla.1990), Van Poyck v. State,
564 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1990), Floyd v. State, 569 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1990), Sanchez-
Velasco v. State, 570 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1990), and Lewis v. State, 572 So. 2d 908 (Fla.
1990). In three of these cases (Ventura, Floyd, and Sanchez- Velasco), the trial court
found only two aggravating circumstances.
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IV. APPELLATE REVIEW: CLOSE ENOUGH FOR GOVERNMENT
WORK?
An enduring theme of the United States Supreme Court's capital
cases is the idea of heightened due process."' In upholding Florida's
capital punishment statute in 1976, the Court emphasized the impor-
tance of full appellate review as a means of effectuating this princi-
ple.27 Since 1976, the Florida Supreme Court has experienced consid-
erable difficulty in trying to comply with the Eighth Amendment
requirement of appellate review.
A. Parker v. Dugger
The United States Supreme Court expressed puzzlement about the
Florida Supreme Court's procedure in review of death sentences in
Parker v. Dugger.278 At Robert Lacy Parker's capital sentencing pro-
ceeding for two murders, his attorney presented substantial statutory
and nonstatutory mitigating evidence. Apparently giving this evidence
some credit, the jury rendered life',erdicts for both crimes. Neverthe-
less, the trial court imposed a death sentence for one of the murders.
The sentencing order made no mention of nonstatutory circumstances,
but did include a statement that "[tlhere are no mitigating circum-
stances that outweigh the aggravating circumstances."27 9 On appeal,
the Florida Supreme Court struck two of the aggravating circum-
stances found by the trial court, but nevertheless affirmed the death
sentence on the ground that the trial court "found no mitigating cir-
cumstances to balance against the aggravating factors.
280
Eventually the case came to the Supreme Court on collateral re-
view. In writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor agreed with Mr.
276. "Where a defendant's life is at stake, the Court has been particularly sensi-
tive to insure that every safeguard is observed." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.'153 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (citing cases). "In reviewing death sentences, the Court has de-
manded even greater certainty that the jury's conclusions rested on proper grounds."
Mills v. Maryland, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 1866 (1988). See also Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685
F.2d 1227, 1253 (1lth Cir. 1982) ("reliability in the factfinding aspect of sentencing
has been a cornerstone of [the Supreme Court's death penalty decisions") and Beck v.
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1988) (same principles apply to guilt determination).
277. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
278. 111 S. Ct. 731 (1991).
279. Id.
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Parker that the Florida courts had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
failing to treat his mitigating evidence adequately. 81 Since much of the
mitigating evidence was uncontroverted, and since the trial court sen-
tenced Mr. Parker to life imprisonment for one of the murders, she
reasoned that the trial judge had necessarily found the existence of
some mitigating evidence."' Noting that the Florida Supreme Court
presents itself as a reviewing court rather than a reweighing court, Jus-
tice O'Connor stated that a purely reviewing court would have ordered
a new sentencing proceeding rather than weigh the mitigating evidence
against the diminished list of aggravating circumstances, and find it
lacking. 8 In the alternative, she reasoned that a reweighing court
would have reweighed the evidence or conducted a harmless error anal-
ysis based on the mitigating evidence found by the trial court, and
noted that the Florida Supreme Court had not done so because it re-
fused to recognize the existence of the mitigating evidence:
What the Florida Supreme Court could not do, but what it did,
was to ignore the evidence of mitigating circumstances in the rec-
ord and misread the trial judge's findings regarding mitigating cir-
cumstances, and affirm the sentence based on a mischaracterization
of the trial judge's findings. 84
Reinforcing the importance of full appellate review in Florida's
capital sentencing scheme, the Court found that the state supreme
court had failed in its duty, stating:
The Florida Supreme Court did not conduct an independent review
here. In fact, there is a sense in which the court did not review
Parker's sentence at all.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Parker's death sentence
neither based on a review of the individual record in this case nor
in reliance on the trial judge's findings based on that record, but in
reliance on some other nonexistent findings.2 80
281. Parker, 111 S. Ct. at 759.
282. Id. at 736-38.
283. Id. at 738.
284. Id. at 739.
285. Id. at 739-40. The comment that "there is a sense in which the court did
not review Parker's sentence at all" can apply with equal force to other Florida capital
decisions. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 572 So. 2d 908, 912 (Fla. 1990), in which the court
conducted no independent review, writing only that the trial court's findings were "sup-
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Thus, while holding that the Florida Supreme Court had failed to
act as either a reviewing court or a reweighing court, the Court indi-
cated that the state system of appellate review had failed to comport
with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment.
B. Reweighing
As noted in Parker, the Florida Supreme Court has declined to
engage in the appellate reweighing of aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances contemplated in Proffitt. 86 During the survey period, the
supreme court reaffirmed its position by stating, in Freeman v. State,
"[t]he trial judge carefully weighed the aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances and concluded that death was the appropriate penalty. It is
not this Court's function to reweigh these circumstances. ' '287
C. Procedural Obstacles to Appellate Review
More generally, Proffitt contains the notion of consistency in reso-
lution of the merits of issues on appeal . 88 In keeping with the principle
of full appellate review in capital cases; the general rule in this country
is to limit the use of technical obstacles to appellate review in capital
cases."89 Florida, however, has fostered the application of the contem-
poraneous objection rules290 and other procedural obstacles to appellate
review, although this policy has not been without inconsistency, as
shown by recent decisions.
In Floyd v. State,2 91 the supreme court held that even though the
ported by the record and we find no error."
286. See Atkins v. State, 497 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1986); Smith v. State, 407 So.
2d 894 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982).
287. Freeman, 563 So. 2d at 77.
288. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242.
289. 41 C.J.S., Homicide § 414, nn. 23-28.
290. Florida actually has several codified contemporaneous objection rules. The
ones that usually apply to criminal cases are section 90.104, Florida Statutes (pertain-
ing to evidentiary objections), and Rule 3.390 (d) and (e), Florida Rules of Criminal
procedure (pertaining to jury instructions). Various other rules and statutes (such as
Rules 3.600, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure pertaining to motions for new trial
and Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, pertaining to recording of
court proceedings, and section 90.107, Florida Statutes, pertaining to limiting instruc-
tions) also bear on preservation issues, as does a confused and sometimes contradictory
body of ever-evolving case law.
291. 569 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1990).
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trial court erred by refusing to grant the defendant's cause challenge to
a juror named Hendry, an obvious lesson is that, to preserve such an
issue for appeal, one should exhaust peremptory challenges, request ad-
ditional peremptory challenges, and have such a request denied by the
trial court.2 92
However, in Trotter v. State,2 93 when Melvin Trotter's attorney
did exactly that in his capital trial, the Florida Supreme Court held
that the issue was not preserved for review:
Where a defendant seeks reversal based on a claim that he was
wrongfully forced to exhaust his peremptory challenges, he initially
must identify a specific juror whom he otherwise would have struck
peremptorily. This juror must be an individual who actually sat on
the jury and whom the defendant either challenged for cause or
attempted to challenge peremptorily or otherwise objected to after
his peremptory challenges had been exhausted. The defendant can-
not stand by silently while an objectionable juror is seated and
then, if the verdict is adverse, obtain a new trial.2""
The purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule is to prevent
the defense from raising for the first time on appeal matters that were
not presented to the trial court. 95 It would appear that this purpose
292. Id. One might say that in Floyd the court confused the logically distinct
issues of preservation for appellate review and demonstration of prejudice. The court
obviously reached the merits of the issue of whether the trial court erred by denying
the cause challenge. Strictly speaking, it held that the defense failed to show that it
was prejudiced by running out of peremptory challenges because it did not show that
an objectionable person remained on the jury. See Hill, 477 So. 2d at 556.
293. 576 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1990).
294. 1d. at 693.
295. Castor v. State, 365 So. 2d 701 (Fla.'1978). In Castor, defense counsel did
not object to an incomplete re-instruction to the jury on manslaughter. The court
wrote:
As a general matter, a reviewing court will not consider points raised for
the first time on appeal. Dorminey v. State, 314 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1975).
Where the alleged error is giving or failing to give a particular jury in-
struction, we have invariably required the assertion of a timely objection.
Febre v. State, 30 So. 2d 367 (1947); see Williams v. State, 285 So. 2d 13
(Fla. 1973). The requirement of a contemporaneous objection is based on
practical necessity and basic fairness in the operation of a judicial system.
It places the trial judge on notice that error may have been committed,
and provides him an opportunity to correct it at an early stage of the pro-
ceedings. Delay and an unnecessary use of the appellate process result
from a failure to cure early that which must be cured eventually.
1992] 1421
65
Caldwell: Recent Florida Capital Decisions
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
would be satisfied where the trial court directly rules on the merits of
the issue that is later advanced on appeal. However, in Nixon v.
State,296 the supreme court held unpreserved an issue directly ruled on
by the trial court. At the end of the prosecutor's argument to the jury
in the guilt phase of his trial, Mr. Nixon's attorney moved for a mis-
trial arguing that the prosecutor had made an improper "Golden Rule"
argument, noting that "at this time to instruct the jury to disregard it
would be to no avail." '297 Although defense counsel had made no objec-
tion at the time of the challenged remark, the trial court treated the
motion as an objection and ruled that the prosecutor's argument was
not improper. On appeal, Mr. Nixon argued that his counsel's motion
for a mistrial had preserved the issue for appeal under State v. Cum-
bie.298 Rejecting this argument, the supreme court stated:
Id. at 703.
To meet the objectives of any contemporaneous objection rule, an objection must be
sufficiently specific both to apprise the trial judge of the putative error and to preserve
the issue for intelligent review on appeal. See Rivers v. State, 307 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 316 So. 2d 382 (1975); York v. State, 232 So. 2d 767
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
296. 572 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1990).
297. Id. A "Golden Rule" argument is one that invites jurors to imagine them-
selves in the place of one of the parties (or, in a criminal case, in the place of the
victim). Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 1985) (such argu-
ment has been universally condemned by the courts). In Nixon, the prosecutor, in a
somewhat confused discussion of his role in the litigation and of the emotions generated
by the facts of the case, told the jury that he had "an obligation to make you feel just a
little bit, just a little bit, of what [the decedent] felt because, otherwise, sometimes I
think it's easy to forget that." 572 So. 2d at 1340.
298. 380 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1980). In Cumbie, the supreme court ruled that a
motion for mistrial made after the jury retired to deliberate did not preserve for appeal
an issue of improper prosecutorial argument, writing:
Clark requires that a motion for mistrial be made "at the time the im-
proper comment is made." In the present case, to have met this require-
ment, we hold that it would have been sufficient if Cumbie had moved for
mistrial at some point during closing argument or, at the latest, at the
conclusion of the prosecutor's closing argument. To avoid interruption in
the continuity of the closing argument and more particularly to afford de-
fendant [sic] an opportunity to evaluate the prejudicial nature of the ob-
jectionable comments in the context of the total closing argument, we do
not impose a strict rule requiring that a motion for mistrial be made in the
next breath following the objection to the remark. Here, Cumbie objected
to the prosecutor's comment, and the trial court sustained the objection
and instructed the jury to disregard this remark. If Cumbie felt that the
judge's admonition was inadequate, he should have informed the judge of
1422 [Vol. 16
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We do not construe Cumbie to obviate the need for a contempora-
neous objection. The requirement of a contemporaneous objection
is based on practical necessity and basic fairness in the operation of
the judicial system. A contemporaneous objection places the trial
judge on notice that an error may have been committed and thus,
provides the opportunity to correct the error at an early stage of
the proceedings. Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla.1978).
While the motion for mistrial'may be made as late as the end of
the closing argument, a timely objection must be made in order to
allow curative instructions or admonishment to counsel. As noted
by defense counsel'in this case, in many instances a curative in-
struction at the end of closing argument would be of no avail. Ac-
cordingly, defense counsel's motion for mistrial at the end of clos-
ing argument, absent a contemporaneous objection, was insufficient
to preserve this claim under our decision in Cumbie. Even if the
issue were properly preserved, we agree with the trial court that
taken in context the comments complained of did not amount to a
Golden Rule argument.299
The supreme court's reliance on Castor is somewhat questionable,
since Castor merely stands for the proposition that one cannot raise on
appeal arguments that one did not make in the trial court. It would
seem that one would be in compliance with Castor where the trial court
rules on the merits of one's objection. In Nixon, the trial judge did rule
on the merits and found the prosecutor's argument unobjectionable.
Given this ruling, there is no likelihood that the trial court would have
corrected the matter by giving a, curative instruction, so that a request
for such an instruction would have been useless under Simpson v.
State3 00 Thus, the underlying premise of Nixon (that the trial court
was not afforded the opportunity to remedy the situation) is invalid
since the trial court would .not have remedied the situation.
Moreover, the court in Nixon made no mention of the fact that a
this fact at the time of his objection or, at the latest, at the end of the
prosecutor's closing argument. The judge then may have been able to give
additional curative instructions which may have remedied Cumbie's objec-
tion. The motion for mistrial in the present case, made after jury instruc-
tions and retirement of the jury for deliberation, however, came too late to
preserve Cumbie's objection for appeal.
Id. at 1033-34.
299. Nixon, 572 So. 2d at 1341.
300. 418 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1982).
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month earlier, in Occhicone v. State,"' it had not found a procedural
bar where the trial court had refused to rule on the merits of an issue
on the ground of procedural default. At Dominick Occhicone's trial,
the state introduced evidence that he had been uncooperative when a
deputy had tried to swab his hands for an atomic absorption test.302
The trial court denied counsel's objection to this testimony as untimely
because counsel had not objected at a previous bench conference con-
cerning the deputy's testimony. Defense counsel subsequently objected
when the prosecutor referred to the testimony in final argument. With-
out addressing the apparent procedural bar, the court directly reached
the merits and held the prosecutor's argument proper. 3
D. Counsel
From the foregoing, the Florida Supreme Court is not entirely
consistent in the application of procedural bars to appellate review.
Even if the court applied the bars with absolute consistency, the result
would be inconsistent application of the law and hence of the death
penalty. Contemporaneous objection rules do not discriminate between
meritorious and nonmeritorious claims, but only between good and bad
lawyering. It is the defendant with the bad lawyer rather than the de-
fendant with the bad case whose conviction and sentence are affirmed.
One obvious solution to this uneven application of the law would be to
relax technical bars to appellate review. In Sochor v. State,31 " the su-
preme court specifically refused to do so. Another solution would be to
raise the quality of counsel. The history of Florida capital litigation
reflects a general inadequacy of counsel in capital cases. Over the years
virtually every decision affirming a death sentence has revealed one or
more substantial legal issues not preserved for appeal. 30 5 Yet Florida
301. 570 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1990).
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. 580 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1991).
305. Most of the decisions affirming a death sentence on direct appeal in 1990
show some major issue not preserved for appeal. Reed v. State, 560 So. 2d 203 (Fla.
1990) (Booth issue); Ventura v. State, 560 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1990) (neither appellate
challenge to death sentence raised in trial court); Pardo v. State, 563 So. 2d 77 (Fla.
1990) (failure to move to sever counts); Freeman v. State, 563 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1990)
(improper testimony and argument; jury instruction); Floyd v. State, 569 So. 2d 1225
(Fla. 1990) (jury selection issues and collateral crimes evidence); Holton v. State, 573
So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1990) (prosecutorial argument); Occhicone v. State, 570 So. 2d 902
1424 [Vol. 16
68
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 11
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss3/11
1992] Caldwell 1425
has not adopted, and does not seem inclined to adopt, any minimum
standards for counsel in capital cases. 00 Nevertheless, two recent cases
address questions involving the adequacy of counsel in post-conviction
proceedings.
Rerneta v. State,307 involved the compensation of counsel in execu-
tive clemency proceedings. Section 925.035(4), Florida Statutes pro-
vides for the appointment of counsel to represent indigent death row
inmates in such proceedings and allows for compensation "not to ex-
ceed $1,000" in attorney's fees and costs. When a circuit court
awarded $3,000 in attorney's fees (based on a rate of $60 per hour)
and $622.78 in costs to Daniel Remeta's clemency attorney, the state
sought certiorari review in the district court of appeal. That court held
that the award violated the statute. 0 8 Mr. Remeta thereafter obtained
discretionary review in the supreme court which upheld the original
award.309 The supreme court stated that the statutory right to counsel
in clemency proceedings "necessarily carries with it the right to have
effective assistance of counsel."31 0 Noting that it had previously spotted
a "link between compensation and the quality of representation," '311 the
(Fla. 1990) (jury instruction); Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1990)
(prosecutorial argument).
306. Guideline 5.1 of the ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PER-
FORMANCE: OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES sets out minimum qualifications for
counsel and co-counsel in capital cases. Lead counsel should have: a minimum of five
years of experience in criminal defense; prior experience as lead counsel in no fewer
than nine jury trials of serious and complex cases which were tried to completion; prior
experience as lead counsel or co-counsel in at least one case in which the death penalty
was sought; and familiarity with and experience in the utilization of expert witnesses
and evidence, including, but not limited to, psychiatric and forensic evidence; and
should have attended and successfully completed, within the past year, a training or
educational program focussing on the trial of cases in which the death penalty is
sought. Co-counsel should have: at least three years of litigation experience in criminal
defense; and prior experience as lead counsel or co-counsel in no fewer than three jury
trials of serious and complex cases which were tried to completion, at least two of
which were trials in which the charge was murder, or, alternatively, at least one of the
three jury trials was for murder and one was for another felony; and should have within
the past year completed at least one training or educational program focussing on the
trial of cases in which the death penalty is sought.
307. 559 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1990).
308. Id. at 1134.
309. Id. at 1136.
310. Id. at 113.5.
311. This "link" was observed in Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109
(Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987) (holding unconstitutional fee cap for
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court wrote that fair compensation of counsel was the "only way to
ensure effective representation and give effect to the right to counsel in
these death penalty clemency proceedings. 31 2
Two weeks after the decision was rendered in Remeta, the su-
preme court addressed a claim of ineffectiveness of post-conviction
counsel in Lambrix v. State.3"3 Cary Lambrix asserted in an unsuccess-
ful motion to vacate his murder conviction and death sentence, that the
attorney who had represented him in a prior collateral proceeding had
failed to provide effective assistance of counsel."1 4 The supreme court
affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to vacate. The court
stated that Mr. Lambrix had failed to demonstrate ineffectiveness
under the test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington.31 5 However, it
specifically left open the question of whether there is a right to effective
assistance of counsel in collateral relief proceedings.
E. Relief
What relief should the court give if it finds the evidence insuffi-
cient as to a particular aggravating circumstance? The Florida Su-
preme Court has not established any set procedure. To the contrary, it
has adopted radically different approaches from case to case.
An example of the court's confused approach was its decision to
reverse Thomas Trotter's death sentence on the ground that the sen-
tence of imprisonment circumstance had been improperly applied.3 6  In
its initial decision, the court ordered a judge resentencing.31 7 But- on
rehearing, the court ordered a jury resentencing, with no explanation
for the change in the relief granted.318
Two decisions rendered on the same day further muddy the wa-
ters. In Capehart v. State,3 1 9 the court affirmed Gregory Capehart's
death sentence even though the trial court had improperly relied on the
premeditation circumstance in justifying the death sentence, 320 writing:
appointed counsel in capital cases).
312. Remeta, 559 So. 2d at 1135.
313. 559 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 1990).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 1138 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
316. See Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1990).
317. Trotter, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S18.
318. 576 So. 2d at 694.
319. 583 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1991).
320. In addition to the premeditation circumstance, the trial court found three
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Having determined one aggravating circumstance was erroneously
considered by the trial judge, we must determine whether this error
was harmless. The record before us reflects three valid aggravating
circumstances and one nonstatutory mitigating circumstance. Hav-
ing carefully scrutinized the record in this case, we are persuaded
beyond a reasonable doubt that even without the aggravating cir-
cumstance of cold, calculated, and premeditated murder, the trial
court still would have found that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating evidence. Thus, the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Holton, 573 So.2d at 293.
We therefore affirm the sentence of death. 2
The supreme court gave no explanation for how it arrived at the con-
clusion that the trial court would have sentenced Mr. Capehart to
death without the premeditation circumstance. Curiouser still is the
court's failure to give any consideration to the effect that improper use
of the circumstance might have had on the jury. Although the judge
rejected most of Mr. Capehart's mitigating evidence, there is no reason
to think that the jury did. One additional vote for life would have re-
sulted in a life verdict, which could scarcely be overridden, given the
substantial amount of mitigating evidence presented to the jury.
Capehart is difficult to reconcile with Omelus v. State.322 At
Ulrick Omelus's sentencing proceeding after his conviction for acting
as a principal in a contract murder, the state argued three aggravating
circumstances: the pecuniary gain, premeditation, and heinousness cir-
cumstances. The trial court did not find the heinousness circumstance,
but did apply the other two in sentencing Mr. Omelus to death pursu-
ant to the jury's eight-to-four recommendation. The trial court found as
a mitigating circumstance that the co-defendant, who actually commit-
ted the murder, was sentenced to life imprisonment. The supreme court
found that the heinousness circumstance could not apply to Mr. Ome-
lus,132 and reversed the sentence for a jury resentencing, stating:
other aggravating circumstances (prior conviction of violent felony, engaged in sexual
battery at time of murder, and especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel) and one mitigat-
ing circumstance ("Defendant is a poor black man exploding in anger over his frustra-
tion due to the ills of a discriminatory society heaped upon him"), rejecting various
other nonstatutory mental mitigating evidence. The jury recommended a death sen-
tence by a vote of seven to five.
321. Id. at 1015.
322. 584 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1991).
323. Although the evidence apparently showed that the killing itself would qual-
ify for application of the circumstance, the evidence did not show that Mr. Omelus
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Since the trial judge correctly did not include heinous, atrocious, or
cruel as a factor in imposing the death sentence, the question that
must be resolved in our harmless error analysis is whether the error
in allowing this factor to be presented and considered by the jury
requires a new sentencing proceeding. We find it difficult to con-
sider the hypothetical of whether the trial court's sentence would
have been an appropriate jury override if the jury had not received
the argument on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel factor and had
recommended a life sentence. Further, because the issue is not in
this record, the parties have not argued the propriety of a jury
override in the briefs or at oral argument. We conclude -that it is
not appropriate for us to attempt to address that question in this
case under these circumstances. Although the circumstances of a
contract killing ordinarily justify the imposition of the death sen-
tence, we are unable to affirm the death sentence in this case be-
cause, given the state's emphasis on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel
factor during the sentencing phase before the jury, the fact that the
trial court found one mitigating factor, and the fact that the jury
recommended the death sentence by an eight-to-four vote, we must
conclude that this error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
under the standard set forth in DiGuilio.3 24
Omelus, on the other hand, is difficult to square with Herring v.
State.326 In 1981, Ted Herring was charged with first degree murder of
a convenience store clerk. The trial court followed the jury's eight-to-
four recommendation of a death sentence, notwithstanding evidence of
Mr. Herring's troubled childhood, psychological problems, learning dis-
abilities, and low IQ. There was no evidence that he intended to kill the
clerk prior to the robbery, but the trial court used the premeditation
circumstance in sentencing him to death,' 26 and the supreme court af-
firmed. Three years later, in Rogers,327 the court specifically disap-
proved of the use of the circumstance in Mr. Herring's case. Accord-
ingly, Mr. Herring argued on post-conviction that, under Rogers, his
sentence was illegal. The supreme court rejected his claim:
intended that the co-defendant inflict a high degree of pain.
324. Id. at 567.
325. 580 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1991).
326. In all, the trial court found four aggravating circumstances and two miti-
gating circumstances.
327. The court wrote in Rogers: "Since we conclude that 'calculation' consists of
a careful plan or prearranged design, we recede from our holding in Herring v. State
[cit.], to the extent it dealt with this question." 511 So. 2d at 533.
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While the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating factor no
longer applies to the circumstances in Herring, we find that this is
not a change that requires a new sentencing hearing in this case.
None of the facts and circumstances that were before the jury re-
garding how Herring committed the murder are changed. If the
aggravating circumstance of a "conviction of a prior crime of vio-
lence" had been eliminated, that would have changed the facts and
circumstances before the jury.
The evidence before the jury established that Herring shot the
clerk once in the head and again after the clerk fell to the floor and
that the second shot was to prevent the clerk from being a witness
against him. Herring I at 1057. Given the other aggravating and
mitigating factors that went into the weighing process in the sen-
tencing phase of this case, we, find that the result of the weighing
process would not have been different had this aggravating circum-
stance not been articulated as a factor in the sentencing. We find
that the elimination of this factor, under the circumstances of this
case, does not .compromise the weighing process of either the judge
or jury. See Hill v. State, 515 So.2d 176 (Fla.1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 993 (1988).328
Capehart, Omelus, and Herring reflect completely different ap-
proaches to the issue. Under Capehart, the court looked only at the
effect of the aggravating circumstance on the judge's sentencing deci-
sion, without regard to its possible effect on the jury. In Omelus, how-
ever, the court did look to the potential effect on the jury, even though
the evidence would have been the same without the circumstance. But,
in Herring, the court held that striking the circumstance could not have
affected the verdict where the striking did not affect the evidence. 29
F. Proportionality.
In Proffitt, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of pro-
portionality review as a means of limiting arbitrary application of the
death penalty in Florida. The Florida Supreme Court has not adopted
a precise procedure for the conduct of proportionality review, and its
cases are sometimes difficult to reconcile with one another, as shown by
the cases of Earnest Fitzpatrick and James Ernest Hitchcock.
328. Herring, 580 So. 2d at 138.
329. See also Jones v. State, 569 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1990) (new jury sentencing
ordered where striking of heinousness circumstance would result in exclusion of evi-
dence of sexual abuse on corpse).
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In Fitzpatrick v. State,330 the court reversed Mr. Fitzpatrick's
death sentence where the trial judge had followed a jury recommenda-
tion of death. The court specifically wrote that it was reweighing ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances and that it was reversing solely
because it believed that, in comparison to other cases involving the im-
position of the death penalty, capital punishment was unwarranted in
this case.13 1
Both cases relied upon in Fitzpatrick involved life verdicts. Hence,
one would safely assume from Fitzpatrick that one could rely on life
verdict cases in making a proportionality argument. However, in Hitch-
cock v. State,3 32 the supreme court disapproved of reliance on life ver-
dict cases in making a proportionality argument:
We also disagree with Hitchcock's claim that his death sentence is
disproportionate. The court conscientiously weighed the aggravat-
ing circumstances against the mitigating evidence and concluded
that death was warranted. The cases Hitchcock relies on are distin-
guishable, being primarily jury override cases, e.g., Holsworth v.
State, 522 So.2d 348 (Fla.1988); Welty v. State, 402 So.2d 1159
(Fla.1981), cases dealing with domestic disputes, e.g., Garron v.
State, 528 So.2d 353 (Fla.1988); Wilson v. State, 493 So.2d 1019
(Fla.1986), and cases with few valid aggravating circumstances
and considerable mitigating evidence, e.g., Songer v. State, 544
So.2d 1010 (Fla.1989). On the circumstances of this case, and in
comparison with other cases, we find Hitchcock's sentence of death
proportionate to his crime. E.g., Tompkins; Doyle; Adams.3 '
V. FINAL NOTE
As noted in the foregoing discussion, there are many capital
crimes issues which will continue to be hotly argued in the years to
come. This will be especially true if the Florida Supreme Court contin-
ues its frequent pattern of ignoring its own precedents.
330. 527 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1988).
331. See Ferry v. State, 507 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1987); Amazon v. State, 487 So.
2d 8 (Fla.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 914 (1986).
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